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UNRAVELING THE TAX TREATY
Rebecca M. Kysar *
Coordination among nations over the taxation of international transactions
rests on a network of some 2,000 bilateral double tax treaties. The double tax treaty
is, in many ways, the roots of the international system of taxation. That system,
however, is in upheaval in the face of globalization, technological advances,
taxpayer abuse, and shifting political tides. In the academic literature, however,
scrutiny of tax treaties is largely confined to the albeit important question of
whether tax treaties are beneficial for developing countries. Surprisingly little
consideration has been paid to whether developed countries, like the United States,
should continue to sign tax treaties with one another, and no formal revenue or
economic analyses of the treaties has been undertaken by the United States
government. In fact, little evidence or theory exists to support entrance into tax
treaties by the United States, and examination of investment flows indicates the
treaties likely lose significant U.S. revenues. Additionally, the treaties enable
taxpayer abuse, stagnate domestic policy, and thwart reforms of the antiquated
international tax system.
Although tax treaties may have, at one time, served salutary purposes,
modern circumstances call into question the relinquishment of taxing jurisdiction
by source countries. I suggest that nations unravel the jurisdictional provisions
from the treaties, abandoning or scaling them down, possibly through the new
multilateral instrument. Rather than assessing antiquated notions of worldwide
efficiency, the challenge for the international tax system going forward will be to
attempt some degree of coordination while also imparting flexibility to advance
national interests in setting revenue policy. This solution aims to thread that needle.

*
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. The author is grateful to Reuven AviYonah, Steven Dean, Jim Hines, Sarah Lawsky, Philip Postlewaite, and participants of the
Northwestern University Tax Policy Colloquium and University of Michigan for comments on
earlier drafts.
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INTRODUCTION
Coordination among nations over the taxation of international transactions
rests on a network of some 2,000 bilateral double tax treaties. The double tax
treaties are, in many ways, the roots of the international system. That system,
however, is in upheaval in the face of globalization, technological advances, abuse
by treaty beneficiaries, and shifting political tides. Yet serious examination of the
worthiness of tax treaties is largely confined to the albeit important question of
whether tax treaties are beneficial for developing countries. Surprisingly little to no
consideration has been paid to whether developed countries should continue to sign
tax treaties with one another. In fact, little evidence or theory exists to support
entrance into a tax treaty by countries like the United States. And in many cases,
tax treaties may be detrimental to their interests. The recent 2017 tax legislation
makes these concerns even more pronounced.
Although tax treaties may have, at one time, served salutary purposes,
modern circumstances call into question their necessity. In short, tax treaties do not
fulfill their purported objectives. Instead of alleviating double taxation, a dubious
goal in and of itself for many reasons, the treaties are the means to achieve double
non-taxation. This is because the tax treaties allocate taxing jurisdiction to the
country of the taxpayer’s residence, which often fails to impose tax. Moreover,
there is little evidence substantiating the claim that the treaties increase foreign
direct investment. This is especially the case for a country like the United States,
which does not benefit from the comity considerations that the treaty system
imparts. Functions such as information exchange may provide benefits but can be
achieved through standalone treaties that do not allocate taxing jurisdiction.
Rather than meet their intended goals, tax treaties inflict harm. Although
recent scholarship laments the revenue losses imposed by the treaty system on
developing countries, 1 even developed countries may lose revenue losses if they
are net capital-importing. Although the United States was a capital exporter at the
dawn of the treaty age, its role has since shifted. In fact, data that I have collected
suggests the United States is currently losing a great deal of revenue through the
treaty system. It perhaps seems surprising that these concerns have not been
1

Kim Brooks & Richard Krever, The Troubling Role of Tax Treaties, in TAX DESIGN ISSUES
WORLDWIDE, SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 51 (Geerten M.M. Michielse & Victor
Thuronyi eds., 2015); see, e.g., Allison Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to SubSaharan Africa: A Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639 (2005); John Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties
Necessary?, 53 TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (1999); Richard Vann, International Aspects of Income Taxation,
in TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1996); Alex Easson, Do We Still Need
Tax Treaties?, 54 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 619 (2000); Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 939 (2000); Lee Sheppard, How Can Vulnerable Countries Cope With Tax
Avoidance?, 69 TAX NOTES INT’L 410 (2013).
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explored by policymakers in the United States but, as this Article argues, is less so
when one considers the limited process and political economy dynamics to which
such treaties are subject. 2
Furthermore, the treaty system impedes fundamental reform of the
international tax system. In the aftermath of recent tax legislation, many
commentators have judged policies based on their compatibility with tax treaties. 3
I argue that such criticism is misplaced; tax reform will continue to be in tension
with tax treaties precisely because the premise underlying the treaties has proven
unworkable. Although some may condemn the unilateral steps taken by the United
States and other countries to tax income at source, the harm that follows will likely
prove to be minimal given domestic methods to alleviate “double taxation.”
Moreover, incremental change that comes from the sovereign exercise of
taxing power may spur a more rational approach to international taxation; one that
is unlikely to occur from the top down due to the composition of various
constituencies that comprise the current global tax players. This bottom-up
rebuilding of the international tax regime is likely a necessary step on the way to
true international tax reform. Although there will be a temporary disruption to the
international tax order, and one which will certainly pose transition costs, such
adjustments are inevitable in the transition to the modern global and digital
economy.
One way to ease the transition would be to employ an ordered mechanism
to discard or scale down those treaty provisions that do the most harm—the ones
that allocate taxing jurisdiction. One possible method is to leverage the new
OECD’s multilateral instrument that is currently being used to add anti-avoidance
principles, new residency safeguards, and other provisions to existing treaties. Just
as the new multilateral instrument can be used to supplement the tax treaties, it can
also be used to dismantle their most noxious aspects, while leaving the more useful,
or at least less harmful, provisions in place. It could also be used to reduce
unnecessary mismatches in tax systems, coordinating definitions of income,
residency, and source, without forsaking taxing rights. Rather than assessing
antiquated notions of worldwide efficiency, the challenge for the international tax
system going forward will be to attempt some degree of coordination while also

2

The process by which tax treaties are enacted stands in stark contrast to trade agreements, which
are subject to full consideration in the Senate and House. See Rebecca M. Kysar, On the
Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2012).
3
See H. David Rosenbloom and Fadi Shaheen, The BEAT and the Treaties (Aug. 21, 2018),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3229532; Reuven Avi-Yonah &
Bret Wells, The BEAT and Treaty Overrides: A Brief Response to Rosenbloom and Shaheen (Aug.
17, 2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3232974.
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giving credence to national interests in setting revenue policy. 4 This solution aims
to thread that needle.
In Part I, this Article traces the history of the international tax and the
bilateral tax treaty system up through the recent 2017 U.S. tax legislation. Part II
explores the stated and unstated purposes of tax treaties, concluding that they
ultimately fall short from the perspective of the United States. Part III examines
harmful effects of the treaty regime, including revenue losses, loss of autonomy
over revenue policy, the hindrance of tax reform, and tax avoidance. Part IV offers
process and political economy reasons for why U.S. treaty policy seems so
misaligned with the national interest. Part V looks at ways in which the new
multilateral tax treaty can be utilized to shed the most harmful treaty provisions
while retaining, and perhaps building, others.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX AND TREATY SYSTEM
A. The Pre-Tax Treaty Era

The primary predicament underlying international taxation is whether
income should be taxed by the country in which the taxpayer resides (the “residence
country”) or by the country where the income is earned (the “source country”). 5
International tax rules endeavor to resolve this dilemma by deciding which country
gets to tax the income.
Deferring to either the source or residence country alleviates double
taxation; the difference is over which country gets the revenue. 6 Typically, creditor,
or capital-exporting, countries will favor residence-based taxation while debtor, or
capital-importing countries, favor source-based taxation. For instance, assume that
there are two countries, France and Great Britain. A French business borrows
money from a bank in Great Britain, and the question becomes whether France, as
the source country where the business is located and where the business income is
generated, or Great Britain, as the residence country of the bank getting the interest,
gets to tax the interest income. If a country is capital-exporting, like Great Britain
in this example, it will prefer a residence-based approach because it will get the
4

See, e.g., TSILLY DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND
COOPERATION 7 (2017) (arguing that the new international tax system must navigate between
competition and cooperation); DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (2014)
(questioning usefulness of notions of worldwide efficiency); Michael J. Graetz, Taxing
International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policy, 54
Tax L. Rev. 261 (2001) (same).
5
Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The ‘Original Intent’ of U.S. International Taxation, 51
Duke L. J. 1021, 1033 (1997). See, e.g., Ke Chin Wang, International Double Taxation of Income:
Relief through International Agreement, 1921-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 73, 81-82 (1945).
6
Adam H. Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty, WISC. L. REV. 740 (2012).
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revenues. If a country is capital-importing, like France, then a source-based
approach yields it greater tax dollars.
The traditional historical account of international taxation emphasizes a
1923 report for the League of Nations by four economists, led by Edwin Seligman,
an economist at Columbia University. 7 The 1923 Report rejected source-based
taxation as resting upon a fallacy of the “benefits” theory of taxation--an exchange
of government services for taxes. Instead, its drafters argued that ability to pay
concerns support taxation by the residence country since it is that country that is
able to ascertain the worldwide income of its residents, not the country of source.
Additionally, the authors of the report had pragmatic concerns over identifying the
country of source. Importantly, the four economists recognized that capital
importing nations would not fare as well under the residence-based approach and
therefore recommended that such division of taxing jurisdiction only made sense
where countries had similar economies. 8
Several years later in 1928, the League of Nations drafted a model bilateral
income tax treaty for the relief of double taxation, which was influenced by the
1923 Report, as well as other precedents. 9 The League of Nations treaty was quite
generous to the residence country, allocating passive and portfolio income to that
country. Although the source country had taxing jurisdiction over business income,
such jurisdiction was limited to instances where the enterprise had a permanent
establishment. Rates on passive income were also capped under the treaties, leaving
residence countries with the ability to tax residual income.
The League of Nations treaty rejected an earlier model treaty, which would
have utilized a methodology to split profits between source and residence countries
in accordance with criteria such as sales. 10 In so doing, it catered to the mercantilist
countries, who wished to tax more income as countries of residence rather than
allocating income to where economic activity occurred. 11 The rationale for this
framework was premised on the “mercantilist belief that imperial countries were

7

Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors Bivens, Einaudi,
Seligman, and Sir Josiah Stamp, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S.73 F.19, at 18 (1923) [hereinafter
1923 Report].
8
Id.
9
Graetz, supra note 5, at 1078 (emphasizing the report, along with other sources, such as the early
U.S. international tax legislation and the work of the International Chamber of Commerce, as
influencing the League of Nations treaty).
10
Bret Wells & Cym H. Lowell, Income Tax Treaty Policy in the 21st Century: Residence v. Source,
5 COL. J. TAX L. 1, 6 (2014).
11
Id. at 34. As Wells & Lowell note, the discussion in the archives with regard to the political
realities was “amazingly frank.” Id. The framers of the treaty all seemed to be aware that capital
exporting nations were benefitting from the choice, at the expense of the colonized.

4

the source of capital and know-how while the colonies were passive suppliers of
goods or services with little value-added functionality.” 12
The 1928 model treaty served as the backbone of the tax treaty network,
influencing the model income tax treaties of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations, and the United States.
The international tax system evolved such that the default was source-based
taxation with treaties as an elective, bilateral mechanism for countries to shift to
residence-based taxation. 13 Even today, the more than three thousand bilateral
income tax treaties have a fundamental structure based on the League of Nations
treaty. 14 This residence-based approach to taxation has since been embraced by the
Treasury Department numerous times 15 and, more generally, through the United
States’ adherence to the double income tax treaty system. 16
The world has obviously changed since the 1920s, with a massive growth
in international capital flows, the creation of the global economy, and the rise of
the multinational corporation. All of these developments increase the stakes at issue
but also underscore that the foundations of the international tax system—the
categories of source and residence—are inherently malleable concepts.
Multinational corporations can avoid taxation by shifting capital income and IP to
tax havens and by arbitraging differences in tax systems. The transfer pricing
regime that attempts to stop profit shifting is premised on a legal fiction, dividing
an economic firm into legal units from various countries, that thus far has proven
unenforceable. Finally, competition for investment and capital has created
aggressive tax competition, leaving many nations starved for revenue. 17
12

Id. at 10.
Rosenzweig, supra note 6, at 741-42.
14
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for
Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1996). The UN Model treaty gives more generous
taxing rights to source countries, but it is fundamentally based on the OECD Model and its influence
has been limited. Sergio Rocha, International Fiscal Imperialism and the ‘Principle’ of the
Permanent Establishment, 64 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 83, 84 (2014).
15
U.S. Treasury Dept., Selected Tax Policy Implications of Global Electronic Commerce, reprinted
in BNA DAILY TAX REPORT L-8 (Nov. 22, 1996); DAVID F. BRADFORD, U.S. TREASURY TAX
POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 89-90 (2d ed. 1984); see also THE
PRESIDENT’S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY (May
1985).
16
To be sure, the origins of the international tax system are not neat and tidy. The foreign tax credit
rules of the early international tax system, for instance, were swayed by a key Treasury advisor, T.S.
Adams, who argued for the primacy of source-based rather than residence-based taxation. Graetz &
O'Hear, supra note 5, at 1027. Although residence-based taxation has reigned supreme since the
dawn of the tax treaty system, this is more of a departure from, rather than a continuation of, the
original international tax rules of the United States. Id.
17
Michael J. Graetz, Foreword—The 2017 Tax Cuts: How Polarized Politics Produced Precarious
Policy, 128 YALE L.J. F. 315 (forthcoming 2018).
13
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It thus is worth examining whether the approach to international tax
embodied in the treaty system continues to be relevant. For decades, the
international tax system was praised as “remarkably stable and successful” 18 but
few would conclude that this continues to be the case.
B. Purposes and Features of Tax Treaties
Tax treaties have stated and unstated purposes. First and foremost among
the former, tax treaties are designed to eliminate double taxation. 19 Double taxation
occurs when more than one country lays claim to taxing an item of income. Tax
treaties attempt to deal with double taxation by either (1) limiting source country
taxation on investment income or business income that lacks a significant and
continuous presence in the source country (the “permanent establishment”
requirement), (2) requiring the residence country to provide an exemption of
foreign source income or a tax credit for foreign taxes paid, or (3) coordinating the
rules of both countries. 20 Tax treaties further establish competent authority
procedures, and more recently, binding arbitration, such that tax authorities commit
to resolving issues of double taxation. 21
Another stated goal of tax treaties is to limit fiscal evasion. Treaties attempt
to achieve this through information sharing provisions, which require tax
authorities to disclose information to one another regarding taxpayers residing in
one country who have tax obligations in the other country. These provisions
override domestic confidentiality laws that bar governments from releasing tax

18

Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 5, at 1026; see also Avery Jones, supra note 1, at 2.
Almost all tax treaties emphasize their purpose of avoiding double taxation by stating in the recital
of the treaty the following: “Convention Between the United States of America and ___ for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income.” Philip F. Postlewaite & David S. Makarski, The A.L.I. Tax Treaty Study—A Critique and
a Modest Proposal, 52 BULL. SEC. TAX’N 731, 734 n.2 (1999). The OECD Model Convention
makes no explicit mention of avoiding double taxation, but did so until 1977. The preamble to the
treaty was changed not to reject that purpose but to account for the fact that the treaty also addressed
other concerns as well. INTRODUCTION TO OECD MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES
ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, Par. 16; Mitchell A. Kane, International Tax Reform, the Tragedy of
the Commons, and Bilateral Tax Treaties 42 (draft on file with author).
20
Rosenzweig, supra note 6, at 1231. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 23 (2016) (hereinafter U.S. Model Treaty) (“[D]ouble
taxation will be relieved as follows . . . In accordance with the provisions and subject to the
limitations of the law of the United States (as it may be amended from time to time without changing
the general principle hereof), the United States shall allow to a resident or citizen of the United
States as a credit against the United States tax on income applicable to residents and citizens . . . the
income tax paid or accrued to [the other treaty country] by or on behalf of such resident or citizen).
21
Id. at art. 25.
19

6

information. This enables the residence country to more readily identify foreign
source income of its residents.
In recent years, tax treaties have been critiqued for focusing solely on
double taxation rather than double non-taxation, which has plagued the
international tax system in recent decades. 22 In response to these concerns, there
are efforts to revise the stated purposes of treaties. As a result of the OECD/G20’s
project against base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS project), a new mechanism
has been developed to update automatically existing tax treaties to conform to
treaty-related minimum standards and to close gaps with existing rules. The
mechanism to achieve these goals is a multilateral instrument, whereby countries
choose which off–the-shelf updates they support. 23 Through a novel matching
process, if a country’s partners in existing tax treaties also choose a particular
change, the treaty is automatically updated subject to domestic ratification
procedures.
The new instrument provides an option whereby treaty countries can adopt
a preamble that commits to the elimination of double taxation “without creating
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or
avoidance.” 24 It implements this language through rules such as minimum
standards limiting treaty shopping, a new anti-abuse standard, and rules against
hybrid mismatches. 25 Treasury indicated that the United States did not sign the
instrument, in part, because its U.S. domestic tax provisions, as well as its
negotiating position for a number of years, already limit treaty shopping and abuse.
Sixty-eight countries and jurisdictions have, however, signed on to the effort. 26
Finally, although the treaties themselves, as well as treaty commentaries,
refer to the elimination of double taxation as their primary goal, some
commentators have emphasized that modern tax treaties have focused primarily on
the reduction of withholding taxes. 27 Although addressing double taxation
necessarily leads to a reduction in tax liability, the inverse is not true. Thus, tax
treaties may simply reduce tax rates without addressing double taxation. 28
22
This dynamic partially stems from tax competition, which distorts the allocation of capital and
results in revenue losses worldwide. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and
the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1576-78 (2000).
23
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MULTILATERAL
CONVENTION TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED MEASURES TO PREVENT BASE EROSION AND
PROFIT SHIFTING (2017).
24
Id. at art. 6, par. 1. The multilateral instrument further provides that the participating countries
can amend their treaties preamble to include a desire “to develop an economic relationship” between
the treaty countries or “to enhance their co-operation in tax matters.” Id. at art. 6, par. 3.
25
Id. at article 7.
26
Kevin A. Bell, Five Things to Know About OECD’s Multilateral Instrument, BLOOMBERG (June
16, 2017), https://www.bna.com/five-things-know-n73014453693/.
27
Patrick Driessen, Is There a Tax Treaty Insularity Complex?, TAX NOTES 745, 748 (May 7, 2012).
28
Id.
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C. The Domestic Rules on International Taxation
1. Worldwide v. Territorial
Tax treaties lack operative provisions of law. Instead, they mostly function
as jurisdictional overlays to the domestic rules of taxation, restricting a state’s claim
to tax a certain item of income. 29 Tax treaties limit the domestic rules by allocating
the right to tax income to one treaty country or by requiring relief from double
taxation. Importantly, a tax treaty does not create tax obligations, which are created
by the operative domestic law. Additionally, under the “savings” clause of the
treaties, the residence countries retain the right to tax worldwide income. 30 Thus,
the curtailment of source country jurisdiction only applies to foreign nationals, not
to a resident of the contracting state.
The domestic rules of international tax are as varied as the number of
countries that employ them, but a few generalizations can be made. Commentators
refer to two different types of international tax systems, worldwide and territorial.
A worldwide system of taxation subjects foreign earnings to taxation, typically with
relief of double taxation through a foreign tax credit. A territorial system of taxation
exempts such earnings altogether.
The majority of developed countries have shifted, in recent decades,
towards territoriality. In reality, however, the distinction between territorial systems
and worldwide systems is blurred, and the systems exist along a continuum.31
Developed countries with territorial systems, for instance, have anti-profit shifting
rules that tax certain types of highly mobile foreign income, which are presumed to
be located offshore simply for tax reasons. These foreign systems could thus be
more properly described as quasi-territorial. The United States’ international tax
system, both new and old, also lies on a spectrum, as discussed below.
2. The U.S. Rules—Pre- and Post- 2017
Experts often referred to the former U.S. international tax system as
worldwide since it subjected foreign earnings to U.S. taxation. However, the former
system never fully taxed these earning. Taxation could be deferred, even
indefinitely, by parking active income in foreign subsidiaries. In contrast, taxation
could not be deferred on passive income, which was, and still is, taxed on a current
29

Rebecca M. Kysar, Interpreting Tax Treaties, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1387, 1411 (2016).
U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 20, at art 1(4).
31
See Mark P. Keightley & Jeffrey M. Stupak, Corporate Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS): An Examination of the Data, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R44013, at 17 (2015) (discussing the
futility of the worldwide and territorial labels); Daniel Shaviro, The New Non-Territorial U.S.
International Tax System, TAX NOTES (July 17, 2018).
30

8

basis under the anti-deferral rules of subpart F and the passive foreign investment
company regime. Additionally, the transfer pricing regime attempted to prevent
companies from shifting too much income abroad to their foreign affiliates by
charging non-arm’s length prices. These rules are notoriously ineffective, yet they
continue to be relevant under the new system.
Since the taxation of foreign source income by the United States might
subject such income to double taxation, the United States has long offered a foreign
tax credit for foreign taxes paid on such income. The credit was first enacted in
1918, 32 long before the United States’ entrance into its first tax treaty in 1932.33
The effect of the credit is such that the United States collects residual taxation when
its tax rate exceeds the foreign rate. When the foreign rate equals or exceeds the
U.S. rate, U.S. tax liability is eliminated. 34
The new regime has been labeled a territorial system because the foreign
income of foreign subsidiaries can escape taxation altogether through the new
participation exemption provision so long as the domestic shareholder owns at least
10% of the stock of the subsidiary. 35 Here again, however, the territorial label fails
since individuals, branches, and smaller shareholders are still subject to taxation on
foreign income. Furthermore, there is a minimum tax regime, called the global
intangible low tax income or GILTI regime, which subjects some foreign income
of 10% corporate shareholders to a current 10.5% tax (and allows a foreign tax
credit offset for 80% of foreign taxes paid). 36 Lawmakers created these worldwide
features since a move to pure exemption, as opposed to deferral, would have
worsened incentives to shift income abroad.
In addition to the participation exemption and minimum tax regimes, the
2017 tax legislation also enacted two other notable reforms. In the foreign derived
intangible income or FDII regime, Congress provided a special low rate on export
income. 37 Through the base erosion anti-abuse tax or BEAT regime, the legislation
also bolstered source-based taxation by targeting profit stripping by U.S. firms
making deductible payments to foreign affiliates. The BEAT subjects such
payments to a minimum tax of 10%. 38 Features of these new rules are in arguable
tension with bilateral tax treaties, a point which will be treated more fully below.39

32

Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919).
See Herbert I. Lazerow, The United States-French Income Tax Convention, 39 FORDHAM L. REV.
649, n.1 (1971).
34
Elisabeth A. Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in Relieving Double Taxation,
17 Rutgers L. Rev. 428, 432 (1963).
35
16 U.S.C. § 245A.
36
26 U.S.C. §§ 250(a)(1); 951A; 960.
37
26 U.S.C. § 250.
38
26 U.S.C. § 59A.
39
See supra notes [ ] and accompanying text.
33
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II.

THE PURPORTED PURPOSES OF TAX TREATIES

As mentioned above, there are both stated and unstated purposes of tax
treaties. The treaties themselves set forth double taxation relief and the prevention
of fiscal evasion as their aims, yet commentators have hypothesized other
motivations behind the treaties as well. This section explores how all of these goals
go largely unfilled.
A. Alleviation of Double Taxation
1. Availability of Unilateral Relief
The need to alleviate double taxation served as the impetus for the tax treaty
regime. The conventional account is that, without tax treaties, multiple countries
will lay claim to the same item of income. 40 The predominant explanation for why
we care about double taxation is that it “represents an unfair burden on existing
investment and an arbitrary barrier to the free flow of international capital, goods,
and persons.” 41
Tsilly Dagan has illustrated, however, that even without tax treaties,
countries have incentives and mechanisms to alleviate double taxation
unilaterally. 42 Instead, Dagan argues that tax treaties serve “much less heroic
goals,” such as easing administrative burdens and harmonizing tax terminology. 43
More nefariously, Dagan contends tax treaties shift revenues from developing to
developed countries. 44 The IMF has agreed with Dagan’s view, noting that tax
treaties based on the OECD model “significantly constrain the source country’s
rights,” and cautions against developing countries entering into such treaties. 45
40

Staff of Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Explanation of Proposed Protocol to the Income
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Using a game theory model, Dagan shows that because countries have
incentives to alleviate double taxation unilaterally, a stable equilibrium of
alleviation of double taxation would be achieved without tax treaties. 46 These
incentives derive from a country’s preferences to achieve a certain level of crossborder investment. Dagan concludes that, under a variety of assumptions regarding
those preferences, the outcome of unilateral policies is single rather than double
taxation. 47
Dagan concludes tax treaties involve something other than elimination of
double taxation. U.S. and global history lends support to Dagan’s conclusion since
the United States enacted the foreign tax credit almost fifteen years before entering
into tax treaties. 48 Today, most countries include in their tax treaties the same
mechanism for double tax relief that they provide outside of the tax treaty context.49
Dagan instead posits that tax treaties exist to shift revenues from source
countries, which are predominantly developing nations, to residence countries,
which are predominantly developed nations. How precisely does this work? The
lower the tax is in the source state, the higher the residual tax will be in the residence
state. For instance, assume Country A, the residence state, taxes income at a 35%
focusing on the United States, argued that “tax treaties play a very marginal role in relieving double
taxation” because “the U.S. has unilaterally provided for the avoidance of double taxation . . .
through the foreign tax credit provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.” Owens, supra note 34, at
430. More recently, commentators have reflected on the diminished role of tax treaties but without
much elaboration or normative assessment. Dagan, supra note 1,at 8 (making this point); see, e.g.,
JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND
FOREIGN INCOME 55:2 (2d ed. 1996) (“Tax treaties are principally concerned with the apportionment
of tax revenues between the treasuries of the treaty countries....”); see also PAUL R. MCDANIEL &
HUGH J. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 151 (1977)
(concluding that double taxation is eliminated through unilateral measures and that tax treaties serve
a more modest function of refining these measures to reflect the relationships of the two treaty
countries); Julie A. Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate Tax Systems,
81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1767 (1995) (arguing that unilateral measures to reduce double taxation has
lessened the need for taxpayers to rely on treaty provisions); Pierre Gravelle, Tax Treaties:
Concepts, Objectives and Types, 42 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 522, 523 (1988)
(adopting the view that tax treaties merely “refine[] and improve[]” the domestic mechanisms to
alleviate double taxation). The ALI, in contrast, has concluded that “[t]here is remarkably broad and
well-established consensus among governments of various political and economic persuasions that
it is in their interest to enter into income tax treaties . . .” AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II,
PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 5 (1992). Even the ALI, however, also
admitted that many treaty goals can be achieved through domestic legislation, outside of the treaty
process. Instead, countries modify their domestic laws only to derive reciprocal dispensations from
the other country. Id. at 12-13.
46
DAGAN, supra note 4, AT 7.
47
Id. at 13-36.
48
Steven Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 944 (2007).
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rate with a credit for foreign taxes paid. If a Country A resident earns $100 income
in Country B, the source state, that is taxed at a 30% withholding rate, then Country
B will receive $30 of tax revenue and Country A will receive only $5 of revenue.
If instead a treaty lowers the Country B withholding tax to 15%, Country B will
receive $15 of tax revenue, and Country A will receive $20 of revenue. 50
Why would Country B forgo its revenues? It aims to increase inbound
foreign investment by lowering the tax burden on it. Additionally, because the
benefits are reciprocal, it may receive more revenues with the treaty than without
it, depending upon the balance of investment flows between the two countries.
Thus, tax treaties would tend to make the most sense when countries are in
relatively symmetrical positions regarding their investment flows into the other
country. In such cases, the taxes the countries lose from their position of lowering
taxes as a source country will be offset by the increased revenues they get to collect
from their own residents in their capacity as a residence country. This is assuming
that the other purported benefits of treaties occur, such as investment,
administrative, and enforcement efficiencies. 51
As this Article discusses further below, 52 the story of the symmetrical tax
treaty is largely fictitious, calling into question whether the traditional account
supporting the entrance into such obligations continues to hold true. Now that the
U.S. is a major capital importer, it is puzzling that its treaty policy has stood still as
its trade flows have reversed. 53
2. Double Taxation Relief Through Harmonization?
If alleviation of double taxation is provided unilaterally through foreign tax
credits, deductions, or exemption, even in the absence of the tax treaty regime, then
it is possible that the treaties serve to alleviate double taxation when these measures
fail, for instance by coordinating tax terms. Tax treaties, however, by and large do
not resolve such matters. If a country taxes domestic source income, then one
function of a tax treaty might be to ensure that what constitutes domestic (as
opposed to foreign) source income is understood by all parties. 54 In fact, treaties
serve no such purposes, instead leaving the definition of source to the domestic
rules. Although some treaties contain resourcing rules that may state that an item
of income is treated as foreign source if a treaty partner is permitted to tax it, these
50
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are not always comprehensive. 55 This amounts to a significant amount of double
taxation that is left to be resolved through the treaty’s administrative solutions, such
as the mutual agreement procedure and, increasingly, binding arbitration. Although
such dispute resolution procedures might be important, they need not be
accompanied by the shifting of tax jurisdiction between countries and could instead
be set forth as standalone agreements. 56
Treaties also do not resolve conflicts of characterization, again leaving a
significant amount of double taxation in place. 57 This is because the treaties defer
to the domestic rules to assign character of income. For instance, suppose the
residence country characterizes income as royalties, thereby concluding that such
income is exempt from source country taxation under the treaty and is taxable by
the residence country. Further suppose the source country characterizes the income
as compensation from personal services, in which case it is rightly subject to
taxation by the source country under the treaty. This produces a conflict, which the
treaties do not resolve. 58
Double taxation may also occur because the treaties do not contain a
uniform and ascertainable definition of “covered taxes,” or the taxes for which the
treaty country must provide relief from double taxation. In the U.S. Model Treaty,
for instance, Article 2 states that the treaty applies to “federal income taxes imposed
by the Internal Revenue Code,” and also covers “identical or substantially similar
taxes that are imposed after the date of [the signing of the treaty] in addition to, or
in place of, the existing taxes.” The term “covered taxes” is notoriously difficult to
interpret and, in recent years, has become subject to intense debate. 59
55
The U.S. Model Treaty currently has a general re-sourcing rule that is fairly comprehensive. It is
intended to ensure that a U.S. resident can obtain a foreign tax credit when a treaty partner taxes
the item of income in question. Technical Explanation of the 2006 U.S. Model Income Tax
Convention, Art. 23(3). Many treaties in force, however, have far less comprehensive re-sourcing
rules. New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Report on Treaty Re-Sourcing Rules 22-33
(Nov. 24, 2014), at
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Avoidance of double taxation is also often not achieved because
transactions involve jurisdictions beyond those mentioned in the tax treaties. 60
Moreover, treaties address only juridical rather than economic double taxation,
thereby allowing some double taxation to occur. 61
Tax treaties could resolve many of the above such matters, but the treaty
language is often very general and its structure interstitial. This lack of specificity
and comprehensiveness is most certainly a conscious choice by the treaty parties,
who are reluctant to grant double tax relief in close cases. For the most part, these
are, however, precisely those cases not granted relief under domestic law, and so
one is left to wonder what tax treaties accomplish that is not already achieved under
the statutes.
3. Double Taxation as Red Herring
Even if tax treaties were necessary to accomplish the avoidance of double
taxation, it is unclear whether that goal should be pursued. To achieve double
taxation relief would require more complete coordination, which may be
undesirable given the centrality of taxation to the governmental function. As Daniel
Shaviro has argued outside of the treaty context, nations may be reluctant to forfeit
their independence in this area. 62 Additionally, defining source “correctly” is, in
many contexts, a fool’s errand. Economically speaking, multiple and overlapping
jurisdictions generate income. 63 Finally, Shaviro argues that the principle of taxing
all income once will likely not enhance global efficiency. This is because countries
vary in their tax rates; therefore taxing income once, and only once, does not yield

Tax Treaties, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working paper series (July 2017), at
https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Working_Paper
s/Series_17/WP1706.pdf. Most recently, whether the new BEAT, enacted in the 2017 U.S. tax
legislation, falls within the scope of Article 2 has become an area of live concern given that regime’s
only partial creditability of foreign tax credits. See supra notes [ ] and accompanying discussion.
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any locational neutrality in investment decisions. 64 Instead, taxpayers will decide
where to conduct activity based on where the lowest tax rate can be obtained. In the
real world, because of differences in tax regimes, double taxation of income may
even increase global efficiency, if, for instance, this would create neutrality
between a taxpayer facing a 20% rate in Country A versus a 40% rate in Country
B. 65
Shaviro, however, goes on to conclude that the avoidance of double taxation
may nonetheless be a worthy goal of bilateral tax treaties if the treaty countries have
the same tax rates and equal cross-border capital flows. 66 The avoidance of double
taxation creates economic surplus by establishing neutrality between single-country
and cross-country income. Because the countries are similarly situated, the
concessions made by Country A in the above example in forgoing taxation of
Country’s B residents are balanced by Country B’s similar concessions regarding
its own residents.
In reality, however, it is extremely unlikely that the two countries will be
identically situated, both in tax rates and investment flows. This is especially true
over time. Moreover, even if such homogeneity exists, the existence of tax havens
likely creates imbalance between the two countries since it is likely that one
country’s rules allow for more or less income-shifting to such havens. 67 It is thus
unclear what goal the avoidance of double taxation is serving, even in the treaty
context. Indeed, the heterogeneity of treaty countries may explain the above
observation—that treaties do not in fact ameliorate double taxation. Doing so would
serve no efficiency goal nor would it be of equal desirability to each country.
Another recent debate in the academic literature exposes what little work
the concept of double taxation accomplishes in the treaty network. Recent proposals
for reforming the U.S. international tax system deviate from the model of full
creditability of foreign taxes under a worldwide system. Shaviro, for instance, has
proposed a reduced rate for foreign source business income and the allowance of a
deduction, rather than a credit, for foreign taxes paid. Part of Shaviro’s rationale
stems from the conclusion that the foreign tax credit’s 100% marginal
reimbursement rate (MRR) problematically makes taxpayers insensitive to foreign
tax rates. 68 This is against the national interest because the United States
government ends up footing the bill for higher taxes abroad. Shaviro’s approach is
similar to other proposals, such as Option Z and that of the former Obama
64
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administration. 69 It also has been partially implemented in the 2017 legislation
through the GILTI regime, which allows foreign tax credits of only 80%.
It is an open issue whether these proposals or the GILTI regime comply
with Article 23 of the treaties, which require either exemption or a credit for foreign
taxes, but there is a persuasive argument that incarnations of them do. Although
historically, the foreign tax credit is dollar for dollar, Fadi Shaheen argues that as a
formal matter, and in furtherance of the purpose of the credit, it is acceptable to
divide a dollar of foreign source income and allow credits on only a portion so long
as the other portion is exempted. 70 Option Z would have followed this approach
explicitly, providing that foreign source income was 60% taxable with foreign tax
credits and 40% exempt. 71 GILTI is a variation of this approach, albeit more
generous, since it is taxing only 50% of foreign source income while allowing 80%
of foreign tax credits. Shaheen’s argument is that, under both the U.S. and OECD
model treaties, these types of proposals are treaty-compliant so long as the exempt
piece and the creditable piece of the income add up to at least 100%.
Mitchell Kane agrees with Shaheen’s general conclusion that so long as the
income can be separated into exempt and creditable portions, a mixture of these
two approaches is treaty-compliant. Kane goes further to add that treaties prevent
the resident country from causing its residents’ foreign source income to be taxed
at a higher rate than domestic source income (taking into account both countries’
taxes). This means that if the source country imposes a higher tax than the residence
country, then the residence country cannot impose any residence-based tax. If the
source country taxes at a lower rate, than the residence country can tax the shortfall,
but only up to its rate on domestic source income. 72
Drawing upon League of Nations documents, Kane’s argues that double
taxation does not really mean double taxation.73 Instead, in the treaty sense, the
benchmark simply means whether the overall tax burden exceeds that that would
have been imposed by the residence country on domestic source income. Tax
treaties, in other words, are about capping rates rather than double taxation per se.
In pursuing this goal, they strive towards a particular result rather than a particular
method. 74

69

Shaviro himself notes these similarities. Daniel Shaviro, Response to Comments on Fixing
International Taxation, 9 JRSLM. REV. LEGAL STUD. 132, 140-41 (2014).
70
Fadi Shaheen, How Reform-Friendly are U.S. Tax Treaties?, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1243. 125051 (2016).
71
STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., JCX-15-13, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF
THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE CHAIRMAN’S STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT OF PROVISIONS TO
REFORM INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION (Comm. Print 2013).
72
Kane, supra note 19.
73
Kane, supra note 19, at 47.
74
Id.

16

Under this framework, what obligation to credit foreign taxes does the
residence country have when it imposes a lower rate on foreign source income than
it does on domestic source income? Kane admits this is a question that the treaty
drafters did not specifically contemplate, but using the above framework, this set
of facts should reduce the burden of juridical double taxation and the corresponding
obligation arising under Article 23. In such cases, Kane reasons that a partial credit,
rather than a dollar for dollar credit, will satisfy Article 23 so long as the overall
tax burden does not exceed that imposed on domestic source income.
Both Kane’s and Shaheen’s analysis seem to suggest that Article 23’s
central concern is aggregate tax burden rather than the method of double tax relief,
albeit Kane’s conclusion is more explicit in this regard. If double taxation seems
like a normatively empty goal, does aggregate tax burden fare any better? It would
seem, after all, that investors care about the overall level of tax they are paying
rather than whether income is technically taxed once, twice, or multiple times.
Double taxation could lead to better tax results than single taxation, if for instance
two countries imposed 10% tax and a single country imposed a 30% tax.
It seems rational, then, that countries should care more about overall
taxation rather than double taxation. It also seems in the countries’ interest to
preserve a mixture of double tax relief methods, as Kane concludes. From the
perspective of the residence country, worldwide taxation with full foreign tax credit
relief cuts off tax competition since the source country cannot set the tax burden on
the foreign source income, whereas under an exemption system, the source country
can do so. But the former system also makes its investors insensitive to local tax
rates and may overly burden its residents. From the perspective of the source
country, it may prefer residence country exemption since it gets to set the tax rates,
however the source country may enjoy the ability to increase revenues without the
foreign resident facing an increased tax burden, as is possible under the credit
system. 75
In Kane’s view, both residence and source countries would prefer a treaty
that preserves policy mixture so that they can balance these various and competing
goals rather than a system that forces them into pure credit or pure exemption
approaches. And, under Kane’s view, the former system is indeed what we have.
Kane is likely right that a hybrid approach to international taxation makes the most
sense strategically and indeed is reflected in the treaties and nearly all international
tax systems. But a further question arises as to whether the treaty is doing any work
here.
If it is in the unilateral interest of both nations to have a mixed system, then
that is likely what will arise without tax treaties. Indeed, the flexibility of the
treaties, as interpreted by Kane and Shaheen, means that neither nation has settled
75
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upon which degree of rate competition versus revenue collection they would prefer,
instead leaving it up to the domestic policies of the residence country. The source
country, in other words, remains beholden to the policy choices of the treaty
partner.
One concession that the source country does obtain, at least under Kane’s
view, is that overall taxation will be capped at the residence country’s tax rate on
domestic source income. Query, however, whether this is any sort of meaningful
promise. Overall taxation still depends on the domestic rates of the residence
country; nothing in the treaty prevents very high taxation so long as the residence
country also imposes such rates on domestic source income. There are political and
practical constraints, however, on the ability of the residence country to tax foreign
source income more heavily than domestic source income.
In fact, it is generally the opposite that we worry about—that foreign source
income goes undertaxed by the residence country. This outcome results because
there are convincing reasons a residence country would prefer to more lightly tax
foreign source income than domestic source income. While location-specific rents,
as well as a robust labor market, might support a high U.S. tax rate on domestic
source income, such factors likely do not support taxation of foreign source income
at the same levels. 76 In other words, it is efficient for a country to tax foreign source
income at a lower rate than domestic source income because it can exercise its
market power more with respect to the latter, thereby making the former more taxelastic. On the other hand, the residence country should prefer to impose some
degree of taxation on a resident company’s foreign source income since doing so
discourages profit-shifting and also brings in revenues. 77
Perhaps because of this balancing act, every tax system unilaterally seems
to tax foreign source income of resident companies more lightly than domestic
source income. In the old worldwide system, the United States’ tolerance of deferral
effectively created a disparity in the rates on domestic and foreign source income,
favoring the latter. Under the new system, that choice is more explicit, with foreign
source income obtaining a 50% deduction. And in pure territorial systems, active
foreign source income is exempt. Thus, it seems that this purported goal for tax
treaties—to constrain the top rate residence countries can impose on foreign source
income—would likely be achieved in the absence of the treaties. Although Kane
and Shaheen’s careful work is helpful in detailing how tax treaties can
accommodate this type of tax reform, we have yet to find a good reason for tax
treaties in the first place.
Finally, without the concept of double taxation as a guide for setting
jurisdictional limits, there does not seem to be any basis to have strict reciprocity
76
77
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of rates through a bilateral solution. Domestic legislation could instead achieve
lower withholding rates.
B. The Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
The other stated purpose of tax treaties is the prevention of fiscal evasion.
Traditionally, this rationale supported the exchange of relevant information. Article
26, which implements this principle, however, is ineffective. In both the U.S. and
OECD Model treaties, a party does not have to provide information “which is not
obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of the administration” or “which
would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial, or professional secret
or trade process.” 78 For many years, countries like Luxembourg and Switzerland
took the position that these carve-outs specifically allowed bank secrecy to trump
information exchange. 79
More generally, a treaty is an odd mechanism to induce banking havens to
share information. The United States may care very deeply about wanting
information from a banking haven, but there is no reciprocal desire on the haven’s
side. They therefore have no incentive to fulfill their agreement. 80 Moreover, when
evasion spans multiple countries, the bilateral format of the income tax treaty does
little to solve the problem. 81
To the extent exchange of information by international agreement is
desirable, there are other means to achieve it. Tax information exchange agreements
(TIEAs) based on a 2002 OECD model agreement allow countries to exchange
information on taxpayers without also reallocating taxing jurisdiction. In their first
decade, over 500 TIEAs were entered into. 82 Newer tools, like domestic legislation
and implementing bilateral agreements, can also be utilized to yield information
exchange. In 2010, for instance, the United States enacted the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act (FATCA) to stop tax evasion by its residents. FATCA requires
foreign banks and financial institutions to provide information on U.S. taxpayers
and their financial accounts. The novel feature of FATCA is a 30% withholding tax
on U.S. source income paid to taxpayers that have not provided information
regarding their residency or identity of their owners.
78
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FATCA requirements, in most cases, violated the financial institution’s
countries’ internal laws. Intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) became necessary
to implement FATCA. According to Treasury, the United States has agreed upon
113 IGAs since 2010. 83 Subsequent to FATCA, the OECD developed the Common
Reporting Standard (CRS) based on the IGAs. It is an automatic information
exchange, which over 100 countries have agreed to implement, and allows other
countries to implement FATCA-like obligations with non-US counterparties. 84
Clearly, FATCA has been a watershed act, and, along with the rise of other
instruments, calls into question the continuing relevance of Article 26. Although
IGAs, in their current form, lack reciprocal commitments by the United States,
IGAs have done much to eliminate bank secrecy worldwide and have also
influenced a global information exchange network. The information exchange
world has clearly moved beyond double income tax treaties.
C. Double Non-Taxation
In accordance with the BEPS plan, the purpose of treaties has since grown
to encompass the principle of double non-taxation, supporting devices like
limitation on benefits provisions and the unilateral override provisions in the new
U.S. model treaty. 85 Although these developments combat treaty abuse and double
non-taxation, they are effectively solving problems created by the treaties
themselves and therefore cannot be invoked to justify the existence of tax treaties,
as will be explained below.
What is double non-taxation and why is it problematic? After all, almost
every type of taxation distorts economic activity so should not less taxation assist
in the free movement of capital? Double non-taxation generally means income that
is otherwise typically taxed in one jurisdiction ends up being taxed nowhere. The
phenomenon is sometimes referred to in the literature as stateless income or
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homeless income. 86 The OECD describes double non-taxation as leading to “a
reduction of the overall tax paid by all parties involved as a whole, which harms
competition, economic efficiency, transparency and fairness.” 87 One primary
concern with double non-taxation is the creation of a race to the bottom, whereby
all jurisdictions are worse off due to tax competition. Another concern is the
preference of cross-border income as contrasted with wholly domestic income, a
concern expressed in the State Aid cases. 88
Resolving the phenomena is difficult as a conceptual matter because the
problem results from the sovereignty of countries over their own tax systems. Since
tax treaties, in their current incarnation, never require taxation of income but instead
function as devices that limit taxing jurisdiction, it is unclear how they can ever
solve the problem of double non-taxation. Instead, tax treaties tend to create double
non-taxation because they allow taxpayers to combine reduced treaty rates on
source-based withholding taxes with favorable domestic tax rules. 89 In order to fix
double non-taxation, domestic law must be utilized, and, at best, tax treaties can be
designed to not make the situation worse. 90
What features, then, of tax treaties give rise to double non-taxation? This
stems from the grand bargain struck between source and residence countries, with
the residence countries obtaining the right to tax “residual” income after a minimal
amount of income has been allocated to the source country. 91 As Brett Wells and
Cym H. Lowell have stated, “our treaties were premised on the concept of
allocating income to prevent double taxation, but the result is that they have
achieved double non-taxation.” 92 The two demonstrate that the phenomenon of
double non-taxation (or “homeless income”, in their words) arises from the League
of Nations’ choice to adopt a residence-based approach rather than one based on
profit-splitting.
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The question that the tax treaties were originally trying to resolve was how
to allocate income between a parent company, typically located in a mercantilist
country like England (the “residence” country, in today’s terminology), and its
supply, manufacturing, and shipping subsidiaries, typically located in British
Commonwealth
countries
like
India
(the
“source
country). The subsidiaries would pay “base erosion payments,” such as interest,
royalties, service fees, and leasehold payment to the parent, which would be
deductible against their colonial income tax. In this manner, residual profits were
stripped out of the source country, leaving it only the ability to tax routine profits. 93
Under these facts, the income is being taxed by the mercantilist country.
With the interposition of a holding company situated in a tax haven, however, the
residual profits could be shifted to a jurisdiction that does not tax such income
through base erosion payments. Although the colonial country could assert that the
arm’s length principle allocates it a certain portion of the profit, typically transfer
pricing methods are limited to the income that should be received by the source
country, thereby failing to police the income allocated to the holding company. 94
As Wells and Lowell note, this planning strategy primarily stems from several
elements bound up in the tax treaty framework: the decision to allocate residual
income to the residence country, with the source country only taxing local
operations; the interposition of a holding company that is not treated as a permanent
establishment and is entitled to receive residual income (and thereby treated as
situated in the residence country); and the deployment of one-sided transfer
pricing. 95
In pursuing the approach ultimately adopted by the League of Nations
treaty, the four economists were aware of the danger that holding companies in tax
havens posed. 96 They recognized that such subsidiaries allowed the allocation of
income to a country that was neither a source or residence country, thus creating
the potential for electivity into a low-taxed regime. Perhaps, though, they glossed
over these concerns because they assumed the residence country would ultimately
find ways to tax such income. As it turns out, however, income shifted to holding
companies has gone largely untaxed by the residence country. Tax competition has
spurred residence countries in this direction, less they face expatriation by their
multinational corporations to a country that does not tax such income. 97
For instance, even under its former worldwide system, the United States
allowed deferral on income allocated to subsidiaries in tax havens. Although
various outbound regimes, such as controlled foreign corporation rules, and
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inbound regimes (such as earnings-stripping and thin capitalization rules) have
attempted to tax such income, tax competition has also caused countries to
rationally tolerate profit shifting. Arguably, the new tax regime instituted by the
United States, with BEAT and GILTI, will strengthen taxation of previously
untaxed earnings. In previous work, however, I have argued that the new law
largely keeps base erosion and profit shifting incentives intact. 98 CBO estimates
that nearly 80% of profit shifting is maintained under the new regime.
Congressional Budget Office. 99 The effect on profit shifting is likely even smaller,
however, since CBO does not take into account investor reactions to the instability
of the FDII regime in response to WTO challenges, investor reactions to the
political instability of the legislation in general, and tax competition from other
countries. 100 Furthermore, commentators and treaty partners have critiqued the new
provisions for violating the tax treaties. As a result, U.S. lawmakers may face future
pressures to curtail the regimes on a bilateral basis.
Tax treaties, however, do seem to be inching closer to addressing double
non-taxation. 101 As stated in the official press release of the new model treaty,
Treasury has taken the position that tax treaties “should eliminate double taxation
without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax
evasion or avoidance.” 102 To further this relatively modest goal, the new model
treaty contains somewhat unique “kill-switch” provisions that turn off treaty
benefits if income is subject to low or no taxation. 103 For instance, the special tax
regime provisions deny treaty benefits on deductible interest or royalties to related
persons that face low or no taxation under a preferential tax regime. 104 In this
manner, the rules preserve source taxation when the residence country forgoes
taxation of the item of income. The treaty also provides that treaty benefits with
98
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regard to dividends, interest, royalties, and other income may be denied if a treaty
partner either (a) reduces its tax rates to below the lesser of 15 percent of 60 percent
of the general statutory rate or (b) switches to a territorial regime. Other changes to
both the U.S. and OECD model treaties attempt to minimize double non-taxation.
These include addressing exempt permanent establishments, revisions to the
limitation on benefits provisions, rules on expatriated entities, and the new general
anti-abuse rule adopted in the multilateral treaty.
Reuven Avi-Yonah has argued that the international tax regime embraces a
principle that income should be taxed once, and only once. 105 He has pointed to
these recent treaty developments as further indication that the world is converging
upon this “single tax principle.” 106 Ample room for double non-taxation under the
treaties still exists, however. There is much uncertainty as to the definition of what
constitutes a “special tax regime” if such regimes are not explicitly identified during
the treaty negotiations. Moreover, if such a regime is implemented through
administrative practice, the United States might not be able to detect it if it cannot
access taxpayer-specific rulings. 107
Finally, it is the treaty regime and its fundamental bargain between source
and residence countries that is the primary cause of a great deal of double nontaxation. That treaty partners are now undoing some of the treaties’ contribution to
double non-taxation through mechanisms like the unilateral override and anti-abuse
provisions cannot be seen as justification of the continued existence of the treaty
system.
D. Foreign Direct Investment
Increased foreign direct investment (FDI) is another cited reason for tax
treaties. We would expect foreign direct investment to increase upon entrance into
a tax treaty for two reasons. First, if tax treaties really do alleviate double taxation,
a proposition of which I am dubious, then we would expect foreign direct
105
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Who Invented the Single Tax Principle? An Essay on the History of U.S.
Treaty Policy, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 305, 309 (2014–2015); see also see Hugh J. Ault, Some
Reflections on the OECD and the Sources of International Tax Principles, 70 TAX NOTES INT’L
1195, 1195 (2013).
106
Avi-Yonah & Mazzoni, supra note 101. This principle has been controversial both descriptively
and as a normative goal. H. David Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture International Tax
Arbitrage and the ‘International Tax System,’ 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 166 (2000) (stating that
“[i]nvoking the international tax system does not constitute an explanation, since that system
appears to be imaginary.”). See also Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate
Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policy, 54 Tax L. Rev. 261 (2001); Julie Roin,
Taxation Without Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S61 (2002); DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (2014).
107
Christians, supra note 85, at 1075.

24

investment between the two countries to increase. Second, the treaties may enhance
the treaty country’s reputation among the global economy, a benefit that would
expand as the country’s treaty network expands. 108
Empirical evidence on whether tax treaties bring in foreign direct
investment, however, is mixed.109 Several older studies looked at changes in FDI
on a jurisdictional basis as countries entered into tax treaties and concluded that
there was no increase in FDI. Newer studies have looked at whether a greater
number of tax treaties is correlated with higher FDI and have found a positive
relationship between the two. 110 It is difficult to confirm causation, however, “since
treaties may precede investment not because they spur the latter but because they
may be concluded only when there is an expectation of such investment.” 111 In the
United States, for instance, this is a built-in feature of treaty policy. 112
One other study has reached both conclusions—that the number of treaties
that a source country has signed with the United States is positively correlated with
FDI from the United States while also concluding that there is a negative correlation
between new and existing treaties with the United States and such FDI. 113 One
explanation for this is that a large network of treaties increases profit shifting
through the source country by means of treaty shopping. On the other hand, new
and existing treaties that are renegotiated may reduce FDI and reinvested earnings
because of the information sharing and tax cooperation features of tax treaties. 114
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The FDI effect is likely to be particularly muted in the case of developed
countries like the United States since the treaty is not needed to signal regime
stability to investors in that context. Moreover, if tax treaties are increasing FDI
because of treaty shopping, developed countries may not benefit from that effect
given the relatively higher rates of taxation imposed by such countries.
Furthermore, investment in the United States may also be more inelastic
than other jurisdictions. This may be the case if demand for U.S. assets is robust
enough to support withholding. 115 For instance, although the United States taxes
real property, foreign ownership of U.S. real assets remains robust. 116 The strong
U.S. market for goods and services may mean that foreign demand could support
higher withholding rates on outbound flows. 117
Finally, although the U.S. statutory withholding rate of 30% is quite high,
it is unclear anyone actually pays it, even without a treaty, given the portfolio
interest exemption and availability of derivatives that are not subject to withholding
tax.118 In this sense, the reduced treaty rates do little work. If treaties did not exist,
then surely the domestic withholding rate would be set much lower, thereby
alleviating concerns of over-taxation. In all likelihood, the reason that the 30% rate
has held so long is that it is a way for the United States to preserve its negotiating
position. 119
E. Comity Considerations
Related to the issue of increased foreign direct investment, it is also posited
that countries enter into tax treaties for comity reasons. 120 Tax treaties solidify
relationships between countries and create communication channels between their
taxing authorities. 121 For developing countries especially, entering into the “club”
of tax treaties improves a nation’s standing in the international arena, serving as a
“stamp of approval.” 122 Signing a tax treaty signals that the country “is willing to
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adopt the international norms,” which may have positive effects in non-tax areas as
well. 123
Although such benefits might accrue to a developing country attempting to
gain a seat at the table, they are less likely to sway the position of the United States,
whose existing trade relationships and agreements with other countries dwarf the
impact of tax treaties. Moreover, an established tax administration that is willing to
robustly enforce tax norms, like the IRS, produces a more effective signaling effect
to other nations. 124 Comity considerations should therefore be relatively minor in
factoring into the decision of whether the United States should enter into tax
treaties.
F. Certainty and Predictability
Tax treaties are also said to signify a stable and certain legal regime. Many
would argue that the current international tax regime is fairly harmonized, and this
is partly due to the existence of the treaty network. The OECD Model has been
incredibly influential, and the more than 3,000 tax treaties in existence are based
upon it. 125 One scholar has noted that “[o]ne can pick up any modern tax treaty and
immediately find one’s way around, often even down to the article number.” 126 As
a result, tax treaties are quite similar to one another.
To the extent that standardization of international tax rules has occurred,
however, we see it outside of the tax treaty context as well—in the domestic laws
of nations. 127 For instance, in the United States, a foreign person will be taxed on
U.S. business income if it is “effectively connected” to a “U.S. trade or business.”
Tax treaties attempt to clarify and harmonize this concept by narrowing source
country jurisdiction over “business profits” that are “attributable to a permanent
establishment.” 128 The treaty standard, however, appears to be no clearer that the
domestic one, causing many to conclude that it is essentially equivalent to the
domestic standard. 129 Indeed, some of the U.S. tax treaties explicitly define the term
123
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“business profits” in a way that references the domestic law. 130 The Service has
drawn upon domestic law to interpret what constitutes a “permanent
establishment,” referencing concepts that are also used to determine the domestic
standard. 131 This is the case for other treaty terms as well. 132
As stated earlier, the treaties generally defer to domestic law to answer
vexing and central questions as to the residency of the taxpayer, what type of
income is at issue, and the definition of income taxes. 133 Tax treaties are primarily
jurisdictional devices and mostly lack operative provisions of law that would more
meaningfully harmonize the tax regimes of various nations. 134 Even as
jurisdictional devices, however, the treaties merely “state general taxing principles”
whereas “Code provisions are tailored to specific situations.” 135
The extent to which tax treaties harmonize international law is thus limited.
This may be due to various reasons. For one, tax law is an area of law that has to
address nearly all economic activities and encompasses all business entities and
individuals, all while aiming to meet critical revenue-raising and redistribution
goals. 136 Given the complexities of these tasks, an intricate body of domestic law
has arisen. Even still, the statutory text does not often address the specific fact
pattern in question and thus reliance upon non-textual sources is necessary to fill
interpretive gaps. 137 Plain meaning interpretation also often seems inappropriate in
the tax setting given the self-containing nature of tax law, which creates specialized
tax terms that do not have analogues in everyday conversation. 138 The highly
detailed character of the domestic law means that treaty-makers may be unable to
incorporate concepts directly; instead they intentionally leave gaps in the treaty so
that domestic law can fill in the details. 139
Another reason for the gaps in treaties is the connection between taxation
and state sovereignty. 140 Treaties often defer to domestic law so that nations can
retain some control over tax policy. Although international law always implicates
130
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sovereignty concerns, these issues are particularly strong in the tax context given
that taxation implicates the revenue function of a nation, which in turns provides
public goods and national defense. 141 Taxation is also a key component of a nation’s
fiscal policy, which allows it to affect growth, prices, and unemployment. 142
It is also important to note that, unlike in the trade context where multilateral
cooperation can contribute simultaneously to worldwide and national efficiency,
international tax is predominantly a zero sum game. 143 For all of these reasons, we
should expect a significant degree of retention of sovereignty in the tax treaty
context. In fact, we do see this, both implicitly, through ambiguity in the treaties,
and explicitly, through incorporation of the domestic tax laws. 144 Accordingly, the
degree to which tax treaties can provide certainty through the harmonization of tax
concepts and terms is limited.
As for stability, the network of more than 3,000 treaties provides some
benefits in this regard. Indeed, as Tsilly Dagan has noted, the treaty system creates
a lock-in effect, which makes transition to a different system more difficult.145
There is, however, a serious cost to this stability, the dangers of which have become
apparent. Long after the system proves useful, it will continue.
G. Ancillary Functions
Tax treaties also may serve ancillary goals such as the prevention of nondiscrimination or the resolution of tax disputes between the governments. Both of
these goals can be accomplished via other means, however. Tax treaties require
competent authorities to endeavor to resolve cross-border tax disputes and,
increasingly, provide for mandatory arbitration. As was the case with information
exchange, there is no need to couple this goal with the divvying up of taxing
jurisdiction. 146 Other international agreements, like the approach taken by the
European Union, can serve the same purpose. 147
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Tax treaties also are said to accelerate international investment through their
nondiscrimination clauses, which require that the treaty partners tax domestic and
foreign investors similarly. 148 These clauses appear in every U.S. tax treaty in force,
as well as the model U.S. and OECD tax treaties. 149 Again, nondiscrimination could
also be accomplished without the loss of taxing rights, perhaps through investment
treaties or domestic legislation. 150 Indeed, major multilateral and regional trade
agreements already contain mandates against tax discrimination. 151 The
nondiscrimination principle as articulated in tax treaties was originally intended
only to mirror existing obligations under the commercial treaties and, as a result,
was not expected to have a meaningful impact. 152
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its later WTOenforced incarnations limit export subsidies (in addition to tariffs on imports).
Export subsidies can include income tax incentives, and these agreements have
been used against several U.S. tax regimes. 153 Some trade treaties limit their reach
to other income tax provisions, but it is possible they could also prohibit income
tax benefits such as accelerated depreciation or tax credits to machinery and
equipment that is produced domestically. 154
Although there is overlap between tax and trade treaties in how they treat
discrimination, the concepts are framed differently and have variances in scope. 155
There are arguments, however, that trade treaties may be more effective means than
tax treaties against tax discrimination. The WTO is a more representative body than
148
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the OECD, has a larger jurisdiction, and the trade agreements contain more binding
dispute resolution mechanisms. 156 That being said, international trade agreements
are currently suffering from serious political scrutiny and instability.
Another issue with tax discrimination is that it is a notoriously ambiguous
and, at times, narrow concept. 157 Under the “nationality paragraph” of Article 24,
the treaties bar the source country from taxing foreign enterprises operating in that
country in a way that is “more burdensome” than nationals of the source state in
“the same circumstances.” 158 Its scope is limited since the treaties define “similar
circumstances” as excluding U.S. nationals that are taxed on a worldwide basis.
This preserves the ability of the United States, for instance, to impose gross basis
withholding taxes on nonresident aliens since they are not in the same
circumstances as a nonresident U.S. citizen (who gets taxed on a net basis). 159 In
the case of corporations, this carve-out means the nondiscrimination principle has
very limited impact in the United States because a corporation that is incorporated
abroad is, by definition, not in the same circumstances as a corporation that is
incorporated in the U.S. 160 Other countries may define corporate residency on the
basis of other factors, such as place of management, in which case
nondiscrimination may have more impact. 161
Under the permanent establishment paragraph of Article 24, a country is
prohibited from subjecting the permanent establishment (essentially the fixed place
of business) of a resident of the other country to “less favorable” taxation than its
own residents “carrying on the same activities.” 162 The permanent establishment
paragraph has no such carveout for residency, but it is often a struggle for courts
and the Service to determine whether foreign residents are “carrying on the same
activities” as residents of the permanent establishment country. 163 Although one
U.S. court has found that a U.S. tax provision violated this paragraph, Treasury and
the Service have traditionally taken a very narrow view of this phrase. 164 For
instance, in assessing thin capitalization rules, which deny certain interest
deductions for payments to related foreign persons, the position of the United States
has been that these rules do not violate nondiscrimination because they also deny
156
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deductibility to related domestic tax-exempt entities. 165 This defense is arguably
unconvincing since the nonresident, for-profit lender should be compared to a
resident, for-profit lender. 166 European courts, in contrast, have given the paragraph
more robust interpretations. 167
Given the uncertainty surrounding the nondiscrimination principle and the
large divide between countries in interpreting it, query whether it would be more
effective to enact it as a domestic provision, or, as previously mentioned, through
our trade treaties given the greater consensus, and means to achieve consensus, in
that area. These routes may be a more forceful means at ensuring equal treatment
of investments. Regardless, it does not appear that the nondiscrimination principle
in treaties is providing a great deal of reciprocal protection, and in any case,
nondiscrimination could be incorporated into tax agreements that do not cede
jurisdiction over the tax base.
III.

DISADVANTAGES OF TAX TREATIES

The above discussion concludes that the rationales for tax treaties are
opaque and ultimately unconvincing. Meanwhile, the disadvantages they bring to
the United States government are potentially significant, as this Part explores.
A. Loss of Revenues
Scholars have argued that the reciprocal nature of tax treaties disadvantages
developing countries by allocating taxing jurisdiction, and hence shifting revenues,
from the country where the income is earned, typically the developing country, to
the country of the taxpayer’s residence, typically the developed country. 168 This
literature points to the asymmetry of the countries’ investments flows as the source
of the treaty process’s unfairness toward developing nations. Proponents of this
view also cite economic evidence, discussed above, that tax treaties have no effect,
or even a negative effect, on foreign direct investment, meaning that the developing
country has sacrificed revenues for little to no advantage in capturing investment.169
The common account is that treaties between developed nations do not
cause similar revenue shifts since the countries are similarly situated. Yet
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conclusions from the developing country literature can be extended to treaties that
the United States enters with other developed nations when the investment flows
between those countries differ, as is often the case in the modern era.
The treaty policy of the United States has remained relatively static since
the 1960s, even though the United States has swung from being the world’s most
important net capital exporter to being a net capital importer due to the massive
increase of foreign investment into the United States. 170 The change means that the
United States, in many cases, will lose revenue as a result of entering into the treaty
whereas before it was likely to gain revenues. 171 In spite of the variances of capital
flows, both historically and between nations, tax treaties remain markedly similar
to one another and to their predecessors. 172 This dynamic stands in contrast to the
bilateral investment treaty context, where the United States has recognized its status
as a capital importer and has taken a more balanced approach towards weighing its
investors’ interests against state sovereignty rather than protecting just the
former. 173
To be fair, the United States may be a net exporter of certain types of capital
and capital flows may reverse rather quickly. 174 That being said, the United States
has been a net importer in the aggregate for decades so it is surprising that its basic
negotiating positions on tax treaties have not changed, in contrast to bilateral
investment treaties. One possible explanation is that under the latter, the United
States is often sued as a source country, thus compelling it to reexamine its
negotiating stances ex ante.
It may also be possible that, although the United States runs a deficit in the
aggregate, it runs surpluses with treaty countries. Given the massive influx of
capital into the United States in recent decades, however, this would be

170

See Rosenbloom, supra note 53, at 83-84.
There have been no studies estimating the revenue impact of U.S. tax treaties and how they have
changed across time as the United States’ capital flows have changed. A Dutch nonprofit has
attempted to calculate lost revenue for certain developing countries with regard to treaties entered
into with the Netherlands. ACTIONAID, MISTREATED: THE TAX TREATIES THAT ARE DEPRIVING THE
WORLD’S POOREST COUNTRIES OF VITAL REVENUE (2016). Another working paper attempts to
assess the costs and benefits of tax treaties, using Ukraine as a case study. Oleksii Balabushko, The
Direct and Indirect Costs of Tax Treaty Policy: Evidence from Ukraine, WORLD BANK GROUP
POLICY
RESEARCH
WORKING
PAPER
7982
(2017),
at
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/534391488205311904/pdf/WPS7982.pdf.
172
See e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction, in THE EFFECT OF
TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 99, 101 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009)
(noting that about 75% of tax treaty terms are identical to one another).
173
Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment Treaty Rights, 56
HARV. INT’L L. J. 353, 361 (2015)
174
Philip D. Morrison, Talking Past Each Other on Tax Treaty Policy and Subpart F, 69 TAXES
1001, 1003 (1991).
171

33

surprising. 175 Frustratingly, the Joint Committee of Taxation makes no revenue
estimates for tax treaties nor does it include them in the tax expenditure budget.
This is because the treaties are Article II treaties and bypass the normal budget
process. 176 The executive branch has also chosen not to provide formal economic
analyses of tax treaties. 177
Although I do not purport to undertake such a formal analysis here, I have
examined a set of data regarding trade, capital, and financial flows in an attempt to
shed some modest insight into whether treaties make economic sense for the United
States. Scholars have long pointed out that investment flow imbalances cause
differences in revenue flows under tax treaties, but, to my knowledge, there has
been no attempt to look at those flows in any detail, particularly on a system wide
basis.
[Note to readers: the below data collection and analysis is preliminary.]
First, I surveyed the bilateral balance of payments data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, which consists of flow data for any given quarter since 2003.
Of the sixty-six countries listed on the IRS website as having tax treaties with the
United States, this data included that of sixteen countries. 178 Of those sixteen
countries, U.S. residents were net borrowers from current, capital account, and
financial-account transactions in thirteen countries over the time span from 2003 to
2017, amounting to net borrowing of approximately $11 trillion or an average
$735.2 billion per year. 179 They were net lenders in only three countries. 180 For
financial-account transactions alone over this time span, U.S. residents were net
borrowers in eleven and net lenders in five, 181 amounting to net lending of
approximately $3.9 trillion or an average $260.3 billion per year. We could roughly
estimate, then, that a supermajority of these sixteen tax treaties are losing revenues.
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Second, I studied the U.S. Department of Treasury Annual Survey of
Portfolio Holdings, which consists of stock data at particular points in a given year
since 2003, with additional data in 1994, 1997, and 2001 as well. The Annual
Survey lists both the value of foreign holdings of U.S. securities and the value of
U.S. portfolio holdings of foreign securities. Of the sixty-six countries listed on the
IRS website, two countries did not have sufficient security holdings to list. The rest
were examined. Notably, the Treasury data revealed the U.S. had inflows of capital
greater than outflows with respect to the tax treaty countries in every year in which
data was collected except two (2006 and 1994). From 2003 to 2017, the net flows
were negative by $22.14 trillion or an average of $1.476 trillion per year. Once
again, it would seem that the U.S. is losing revenues from the tax treaty system as
a whole.
I also looked at the relative flows of each country for the year 2017. Of the
countries examined, thirty-six had inflows greater than outflows, meaning there
were more holdings by that country’s residents of U.S. securities than U.S. holdings
of those country’s securities. Twenty-eight countries had outflows greater than
inflows, meaning that U.S. investors held more of those countries’ securities than
vice versa. Notably, the amount of inflows, in total, exceeded outflows by $4.54
trillion for that year.
There are, of course, caveats to this analysis. First, bilateral economic flows
cannot tell us the revenue picture in its entirety. Any formal analysis should account
for increased investment as a result of the treaty, for instance. Second, even for the
flow data, these are just snapshots in time, reflecting only the current economic
position of the United States via its treaty partners. That being said, because the
treaties are so entrenched, one can see the danger of committing to them given the
fact that economic flows can reverse rather quickly and dramatically. This
highlights the difficulty of tax treaties more generally. Third, we could imagine that
the breakdown of flows differs between income types, which may be relevant in
calculating revenue losses from the treaties. For instance, if the U.S. is a capital
exporter for royalties, then perhaps it is gaining from the treaties even if it is capital
importing with respect to other types of income, like interest. This is because the
treaty restricts source country jurisdiction over royalties but generally does not alter
the treatment of interest, which is generally exempt under the U.S. portfolio interest
rules. 182
Revenue losses can also come about because of the interaction between the
domestic law and the treaty or the disparity in tax systems. 183 For instance, one
could imagine that two similarly situated countries would sign a tax treaty,
reasoning that any rate reduction they provide on source income from the other
country’s residents would be counterbalanced by an increase in domestic taxes
182
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through the residual taxation of foreign source income of its own residents, who are
now also receiving the benefit of lower rates in the other country. If, however, a
country does not tax on a worldwide basis, the calculus is different. Its residents
may enjoy the lower foreign rate, unencumbered by residual taxation. The territorial
regime means that the lower foreign tax treaty rates will not effectuate an increase
in domestic revenues. This bargain may still be in the country’s interest, but the
benefits are flowing to its residents rather than to government coffers. 184
The 2017 changes to the U.S. international tax system are likely to
complicate the revenue picture of U.S. tax treaties. For one, the partial transition to
a territorial system means that the United States is forgoing residual taxation as a
residence state on foreign income earned by closely held corporations. 185 Yet this
is counterbalanced by the new minimum tax regime that is imposed on such
income. The reduction of the corporate rate all the way to 21% means that no
residual taxation will be paid on foreign income so long as U.S. corporations are
taxed at a 13.125% rate abroad. 186
This picture is further exacerbated by the fact that the blending of tax credits
is allowed to reduce tax liability under residual taxation for individuals and others
who do not receive the benefits of territoriality. Treaties allow taxpayers to cross
credit income that receives favorable treaty rates with high taxed income, thereby
minimizing the limitation on foreign tax credits under U.S. law. 187 This dynamic
will also occur under the new minimum tax regime, leading to further revenue
losses.
On the flipside, because the U.S. is no longer recouping residual taxation
on a significant amount of foreign income, we could expect that some countries
will push for more tax treaties with the United States since the reductions in source
taxation that they agree to will benefit U.S. investors rather than the U.S. Treasury.
Presumably, this strengthens the case for increased foreign direct investment. Still,
some countries may worry that a move to territoriality may instead trigger an
undesirable race to the bottom, requiring a reciprocal exemption system. It also may
make the residents of the other treaty country more cost-conscious with respect to
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foreign taxes since they no longer enjoy a 100% marginal reimbursement rate in
the form of foreign tax credits, thus harming the source countries ability to tax.188
Overall, it is puzzling that tax treaties do not take into account differences
in investment flows, disparities in tax systems, and various ways in which the model
treaty may diverge from the national interest. Despite the enormous economic and
legal changes that have developed since the model tax treaties were first developed,
far from becoming more heterogeneous, tax treaties seem to be converging. 189
Moreover, despite the fact that Elisabeth Owens called for formal analysis of the
costs and benefits of tax treaties nearly sixty years ago, there has been virtually no
progress on that front. 190 I explore possible reasons for these phenomena below.191
B. Stagnation of Domestic Policy and International Tax Norms
Another problematic effect of tax treaties is the stagnation of domestic
policy and international tax norms. Over two decades ago, John Avery Jones cited
the proliferation of treaties as problematically locking in both domestic and treaty
policy. 192 Tax treaties cannot be easily changed because they are so numerous.193
And, unless countries are willing and able to override tax treaties, domestic policy
is stymied. 194 The problem has only worsened since Avery Jones raised the issue,
with the number of treaties having more than doubled since then.
Of course, stagnation may not be a problem if the treaty regime locks in
beneficial policy. Although tax treaties may have initially served some valid
purposes, they, however, more recently have contributed to the breakdown of the
international tax system. As discussed above, instead of easing double taxation,
treaties have contributed to double non-taxation. 195 This problem has grown
exponentially with the rise of digital technology and immensely valuable (and
easily shifted) intellectual property. Moreover, their requirements have increasingly
come into conflict with possible solutions to the problems plaguing the
international tax system. Recent U.S. tax reform has brought this problem into the
spotlight.
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1. The Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax and Potential Treaty Conflicts
In 2016, Republicans began to set forth their platform to overhaul the
international tax provisions. Their initial plan was to replace the corporate income
tax with a destination-based cash flow tax (“DBCFT”). The DBCFT would have
essentially been a modified VAT, with a deduction for wages. 196 Like a VAT, the
tax would also have been border-adjusted, meaning that it excludes exports and
taxes imports without deduction for costs. 197 Its features meant that the DBCFT
would have treated debt and equity equally, removed taxes on investment returns,
and removed incentives to profit shift and offshore activities. 198 Taxing on a
destination basis (where sales occur) offers advantages relative to taxing on an
origin basis (where value is created). In general, the residency of customers is more
fixed than that of corporations, and thus taxing a business on this basis likely
reduces tax avoidance. Additionally, ascertaining where products or services are
invented is an economic fiction that has proven impossible to execute, leading to
the shifting of profits through transfer pricing games.
There are reasons to think that a destination-based approach should at least
supplement revenue collection given the rise of the multinational corporation.
However, the plan was critiqued, in part, for its incompatibility with the tax treaty
regime if the DBCFT was considered a “covered tax” under the treaties. 199 If so,
the treaties’ permanent establishment requirement, which essentially requires a
physical presence in the source country before that country can exercise taxing
jurisdiction over business profits, would forbid the imposition of a destinationbased tax that taxes where goods are sold. In short, the very feature that makes the
DBCFT attractive is the same trait that makes it incompatible with the treaties—
taxing at destination versus origin.
In addition to the conflict with the permanent establishment limitation, the
DBCFT also implicated other treaty provisions. In order to include all imports, the
DBCFT should be levied on intangibles that produce royalties and other types of
deductible payments that can substitute for royalties since their exclusion would
invite tax abuse. If the DBCFT is considered an income tax, however, then such
inclusion would constitute a treaty override because it would violate the treaty
provisions that forbid withholding on such payments. 200 The DCBFT also might
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arguably violate the nondiscrimination provision of the treaties by advantaging
exporters over importers. 201 Furthermore, if the DBCFT is not an income tax and
therefore outside the treaty’s scope, treaty partners would be under no obligation to
provide foreign tax credits to their residents who pay the tax. 202
A further issue results from the fact that U.S. corporations may no longer
be U.S. residents under the treaty because, under the DBCFT, they would no longer
be “liable to tax . . . by reason of . . . domicile, residence, citizenship, place of
management, place of incorporation, or any other criterion of a similar nature.” 203
Accordingly, foreign taxpayers may no longer benefit from the treaty provision that
reduces withholding on dividends, among other complications. 204
Another challenge is that if the United States were to enact the DBCFT,
then its treaty partners may no longer have incentives to maintain or renegotiate
treaties. 205 This is because the United States would be giving up its jurisdiction to
tax income as the residence country; therefore, why should a source country provide
relief from its withholding tax? On the other hand, if the United States was no
longer taxing worldwide income, the source country’s reduction of withholding tax
would flow to the investor rather than the United States Treasury, therefore perhaps
strengthening the source country’s ability to attract investment. 206 The source
country may also feel increased pressure to reduce its taxation of direct investment
income considering the favorable tax treatment U.S. investment would receive. 207
Another concern would be the potential for tax arbitrage between the
DBCFT, which would not tax income, and a treaty partner’s income tax system that
allows for interest deductions. 208 This arbitrage opportunity may induce treaty
partners to terminate their treaties in order to impose higher withholding taxes on
interest and dividends to U.S. residents. 209 Congress may attempt to stave off such
terminations by imposing its own withholding tax on interest and dividends to nonresidents, but this may itself violate the nondiscrimination provision since the
United States may not be taxing investment income of its own residents. 210 Even if
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the provision was upheld, the United States may wish to condition any treaty
exemptions of the new discriminatory tax on reciprocal exemption from the treaty
partner, a perhaps undesirable bargain for a country with reciprocal trade flows with
the United States and a large tax base. 211
In short, the enactment of the DBCFT would cause chaos in the international
tax community. The myriad issues presented by the tax have caused some to predict
that its enactment could lead to the collapse of the treaty regime. 212 Moreover, this
problem is not specific to the DBCFT. Other significant new taxes in other
countries pose classification challenges for tax treaties. In the past few years, The
Indian Equalization Levy, the UK Diverted Profits Tax, the Australian Diverted
Profits Tax, the Netherlands Excessive Severance Tax, and the Belgian Fairness
Tax—are all hybrid taxes of some nature and serious questions have arisen over
their relationship with the treaty system. 213 Together, these taxes and the U.S.
reforms, discussed below, are part of a larger debate over taxing on a destination
basis versus an origin basis. 214
More recently, the European Commission has proposed levying a turnover
tax on the digital revenues, which would almost exclusively hit U.S. technology
companies. The EU Council Legal Service issued an opinion that the digital
services tax is not an indirect tax, 215 which also makes it harder to contend that tax
treaties are not in conflict with it since tax treaties demand certain requirements of
direct taxes. The digital services tax is fundamentally flawed because it focuses
only on digital companies, but it is also likely to suffer from design problems
because its proponents have attempted to enact it within the treaty-based context of
a permanent establishment, stretching this concept to the point of disbelief. 216
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Justifying the tax by using the notoriously vague concept of value creation will set
no reliable architecture for the new tax. 217
We might search for a procedural solution to all of this. If the DBCFT
presents difficulties of treaty interpretation, and was clearly not contemplated in the
treaty’s design, then the states should endeavor to resolve the issue by mutual
agreement. Going forward, a clause could be inserted in Article 2 of the treaties to
cover significant new taxes if the parties reach a mutual agreement to this effect.
The hybrid nature of these taxes requires further clarification from the treaty
partners, and asking courts and arbitrators to fill these significant gaps may be
beyond their institutional capacity. Yet even if an administrative solution was
achievable, the complexities resulting from the mapping of these taxes onto the
treaty system expose the latter’s rigidity. International movement towards
destination-based taxes or increased taxation at source is preferable, but this is
antithetical to the fundamental deal cut in tax treaties. As a result, the substance of
the proposals have suffered, and the treaty regime makes the likelihood of such a
shift more remote.
2. The BEAT
a. Potential Treaty Conflicts
Although Republicans abandoned the DBCFT, the 2017 tax legislation that
was enacted also poses significant challenges to the tax treaty system. Among the
changes to the tax law is the new inbound base erosion regime, which is designed
to prevent earnings stripping from companies that have been able to erode the base
by making deductible payments to related foreign parties.
The originally proposed inbound regime was the House excise tax. 218 The
excise tax subjected income from deductible items, including royalties and cost of
goods sold, to an excise tax, which was designed to prompt taxpayers to elect to
treat such payments as effectively connected income. The Ways and Means
committee report made clear that the new tax was necessary to supplement transfer
pricing principles, which were not sufficient to stop inbound base erosion. 219
There is a strong argument that the proposed House excise tax would have
breached treaty obligations because the tax was designed to hit multinationals
without a permanent establishment, in violation of Article 7 of the treaty. 220 The
217
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excise tax also was vulnerable to the criticism that it was an indirect way to impose
withholding taxes on royalties, contrary to Article 12 of the treaties. Additionally,
the tax also arguably violated the arm’s length standard of Article 9 of the treaties
because it would have applied to cost of goods sold between the related parties
regardless of what parties dealing at arm’s length would have agreed to do.
The end result of the excise tax would have also been to tax foreign-earned
income, with no foreign tax credit or double tax relief. Such criticism forced the
House to revise the proposal to allow a partial foreign tax credit. This was the case
even though the United States would have been crediting residence country taxes
as the source country, when traditionally foreign tax credits are offered by the
residence country for source country taxes. 221 This revision reduced the revenue
estimate of the proposal. 222
In part because of its tension with the tax treaties, Congress abandoned the
House excise tax, instead enacting the BEAT, a new and separate tax. 223 The BEAT
functions as an alternative minimum tax, adding back in certain deductible
payments to foreign related parties (but not U.S. related parties) to constitute a
“modified taxable income” base. 224 The BEAT liability is the excess of 10% of that
base over the taxpayer’s regular tax liability. Notably, although it functions similar
to the now repealed corporate alternative minimum tax, the BEAT does not allow
foreign tax credits in the calculation of the base. 225
Importantly, the BEAT also allows parties to circumvent it because it
exempts cost of goods sold, including imbedded royalties. 226 In contrast, the House
excise tax would have left less room for circumvention because it would have
applied to cost of goods sold. Unfortunately, because the House tax applied to cost
of goods sold, it likely would have violated the arms’ length principle of the treaties.
The alternative minimum tax structure of the BEAT is an attempt to
accommodate tax treaties, but a group of EU Ministers asserted that the BEAT
regime could be viewed as discriminating against foreign companies in violation of
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bilateral tax treaties. 227 Article 24(5) of our double tax treaties provides that treaty
partners cannot tax residents of the other treaty country more heavily than its own
residents. 228 Arguably, the BEAT violates this nondiscrimination clause because a
foreign-owned U.S. entity will be subject to the BEAT regime whereas a U.S.owned U.S. entity will not be. One counter-argument is that the BEAT applies
regardless of who ultimately owns the corporation. 229 Thus, the BEAT applies to
payments from a U.S. entity to a foreign entity that is owned by the U.S. entity (a
CFC), which indicates that the intent was to protect the U.S. tax base rather than to
discriminate against foreign-owned U.S. parties. 230
Another arguable path to treaty violation is Article 24(4), which commands
that foreign residents be entitled to deductions “under the same conditions” as U.S.
residents. 231 The BEAT regime, however, is arguably not equivalent to the denial
of a deduction, and interest, royalties, and other items remain fully deductible.
Instead, the BEAT merely subjects the tax benefit conferred by such deductions to
the 10% tax; denying a tax deduction would increase the tax on the item by 21%,
not 10%. 232 Additionally, the base erosion rules are perhaps sanctioned under
Article 24(4) because they are necessary to arrive at an appropriate arm’s length
result within the meaning of Article 9 of the treaties, although this argument seems
less forceful since the BEAT applies even when arm’s length prices are charged. 233
The BEAT may also violate Article 23, which requires treaty partners to
grant a foreign tax credit for income tax of the treaty partner “in accordance with
the provisions and subject to the limitations of the law of the United States (as it
may be amended from time to time without changing the general principle
hereof.” 234 Since the BEAT offers no foreign tax credit, it may be inconsistent with
227
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the “general principle” of Article 23. 235 It is possible, however, that the BEAT is
not a “covered tax” under Article 2 of the treaty and therefore not subject to the
requirements of Article 23 (although still subject to Article 24). 236 If the BEAT did
not fall within this category of “covered taxes,” then a treaty partner could not
object to the disallowance of foreign tax credits.
As discussed above, what constitutes a covered tax is a difficult question,
and the status of many new taxes is in doubt. 237 Relevant to the BEAT context,
however, is that the United States has previously taken the position that the AMT
was covered by the treaties and the two taxes are structurally similar. 238 Another
counter to the argument that the BEAT falls outside the treaties’ scope is that
Congress chose to enact it as part of subtitle A (“Income Taxes”) of the Code. 239 In
favor of BEAT’s non-coverage, however, is the fact that it denies deductions for
payments to related foreign persons, therefore falling outside the definition of an
“income” tax. 240
b. Overrides and Implications of Treaty Conflicts
If the BEAT is a covered tax, then should it not simply constitute a treaty
override? There is current scholarly debate over how easily Congress can override
treaties, which has implications for the issue of whether treaties stymie domestic
reform. If Congress can readily override treaties, then perhaps we need not worry.
If it cannot, then perhaps the concern is more justified.
As mentioned above, under the U.S. Constitution, treaties and statutes are
both “supreme law” and, as discussed above, the Court has held that, when there is
a conflict between the two, the one enacted “later in time” will prevail. 241 David
Rosenbloom and Fadi Shaheen argue that a Supreme Court case, Cook v. United
States, stands for the proposition that Congress must clearly express treaty
overrides, otherwise “a treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or
modified by a later statute.” 242 This is surely correct as a restatement of the
reasoning of Cook, but Cook should be read as a rule of statutory interpretation,
only applicable if there is a question as to how the statute should be constructed.
The Court itself cabined its reasoning as to resolving “any doubt as to the
construction of the statute.” In essence, the Cook doctrine can be seen as a variation
on the Charming Betsy canon, which is used to construe statutes as to avoid treaty
235
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violations. 243
Moreover, the Cook Court was also applying the doctrine in a rather narrow
set of circumstances—interpreting the reenactment of a statute that preceded a later
enacted treaty. The reenactment was identical to the statute that was later
superseded by the treaty, and the Court held that the later in time rule privileged the
treaty. In this unusual set of facts, it can be inferred that Congress’s intent was to
not abrogate the treaty. In other words, the circumstances produced clear expression
of Congress’s intent. This should not foreclose other ways in which Congress can
clearly express its intent to override.
One such way for Congress to do so is through enactment of a statute that
clearly conflicts with a prior treaty. In the instant case, the BEAT plainly does not
provide a foreign tax credit. Courts should not rewrite the statute to avoid a treaty
conflict. Nor should the statute be rewritten to calculate the modified taxable
income base to allow deductions for otherwise deductible payments to related
persons resident in treaty countries, when this is explicitly forbidden by the statute.
Yes, courts are reluctant to find treaty and statutory conflicts, but they do not
rewrite statutes to accommodate treaties. 244
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There may be additional arguments for why we should privilege statutes
above treaties when enacted later in time in the tax context specifically. Sections
894(a) and 7852(d) of the Code reiterate that treaties and statutes are on equal
footing. 245 The legislative history of these sections indicates that Congress wished
to codify the last in time rule for tax provisions 246 and specifically rejected the IRS’s
position that, under Cook, a statute must explicitly override a treaty in order for it
to take precedence. 247
I have also previously argued that tax treaties are likely in tension with the
Origination Clause, which requires all revenue legislation to originate in the House,
because, as self-executing Article II treaties, they omit the House from the treaty
process. 248 To quell the House’s ability to override treaties, by requiring clear
expression of intent for instance, would lay in further tension with the Origination
Clause since overrides are one way the House traditionally protects its
constitutional prerogative. 249 Although the availability of congressional overrides
does not cure the constitutional defect, it does allow the House to participate at least
too far to simply impute congressional intent from their statements in the record concerning working
assumptions on the legislation.
245
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somewhat to formulate revenue policy in an area from which it is otherwise
omitted.
Finally, there is some historical precedent for allowing treaty overrides
without clear statements in the tax context. Since the enactment of section 7852(d)
in 1988 and prior to the enactment of the 2017 tax bill, there have been at least three
instances in which Congress has enacted statutes that conflict with the treaties while
being silent on the issue in both the statutory text and legislative history. In 2004,
Congress enacted an excise tax on nonresident alien “insiders” of an expatriating
U.S. corporation. In 2008, Congress imposed a transfer tax on gifts or bequests
from an expatriate. In 2010, Congress enacted the net investment income tax, which
can apply to foreign source income without foreign tax credit allowances. 250 In
none of these cases have courts mandated that the statutes be rewritten to
accommodate the treaties. 251
Should we then conclude that Congress has an easy time overriding treaties
and therefore our concerns about stymying tax reform are unfounded? Certainly
under Rosenbloom and Shaheen’s view, the concern that tax treaties impede tax
reform is more acute since Congress has to affirmatively state their intention to
violate international law, which, shall we say, could be awkward. But we have
reason to worry about Congress’s agency over domestic reform even if we reject
Rosenbloom and Shaheen’s reading of the caselaw.
International law, not U.S. law, determines whether or not international
obligations continue; obligations under international law may continue in the face
of a congressional override of the treaty. Congress will be reluctant to put the
United States in breach of its obligations. 252 This is likely a reason why overrides
of tax treaties occur predominantly in the tax treaty abuse context, where they are
more justifiable. 253
There is also reason to indicate that Congress may be less willing to override
treaties going forward. It used to be the case that after the treaty overrides of the
80s and 90s, Congress was able to renegotiate the existing tax treaties in order to
accommodate the statutory changes. Recently, however, the Senate has been unable
to move treaties through the Article II process, and many have been languishing for
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years. 254 The possibility of renegotiation thus is much more remote in the current
era than in prior eras of treaty overrides. This may have a chilling effect on the
amount of treaty overrides Congress is willing to do, and thus the concern for policy
stasis is likely to be even greater than before.
Indeed, many legislative proposals are abandoned or narrowed out of
concern for treaty conflicts, as this discussion has demonstrated. In part out of
concern for incompatibility with international obligations, Congress enacted the
less ambitious BEAT, rather than the House’s excise tax. Arguably, the inbound
tax regime would have been more ambitious in scope, and hence more effective, if
this had not been the case.
To conclude, tax treaties, especially in recent years, impede domestic
reform. Although Congress may, at times be willing to override the treaties, it likely
does so much less often than if such an act were authorized by international law
and blessed by our treaty partners. This is a risk inherent to all treaties, to an extent,
but is particularly problematic in the tax treaty context, the foundations of which
have not been modernized to take into account developments such as the rise of the
multinational corporation and electronic commerce. The tax treaty network rests on
a foundation of arbitrary and conflicting rules that distort economic activity and
spawn tax competition. It also has served to keep that foundation in place, long past
its shelf life. International movement toward destination-based taxes, greater source
taxation, or even formulary apportionment, would be preferable, but the treaty
regime makes the likelihood of such a shift more remote. Although the
constitutional structure in the United States allows some relief from this danger, it
by no means solves the fundamental problem.
c. The Danger of Rate Stasis
In addition to impeding structural tax reform, treaties also obstruct domestic
policy other ways. Perhaps the most visible feature of tax treaties is the ceiling they
impose on withholding rates. An underappreciated consequence of this ceiling is
that, unless the United States wishes to tax such income at rates below those set
forth by the treaty, domestic rates on outbound income are effectively fixed. The
rate ceiling thus hamstrings domestic policy such that the government cannot be as
reactive to macroeconomic conditions, fiscal crises, or other factors. This presents
troubling effects on efficiency and limits the ability to deploy countercyclical
responses. 255
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C. Tax Abuse Opportunities
A third disadvantage of tax treaties is that they encourage tax avoidance as
a result of the ceding of taxing jurisdiction and the interface between the treaties
and domestic provisions. 256 Since this was discussed in the context of whether tax
treaties fulfill their promise of achieving double non-taxation, I will not discuss it
here. But it is a significant downside and one that costs revenue.
IV.

WHY DOES U.S. TREATY POLICY REMAIN IN THE PAST?
A. Process Deficiencies and Political Economy

If tax treaties have these negative effects and also fail to fulfill their
purposes, why has U.S. tax treaty policy remained stagnant for decades? For one,
tax treaties suffer from a deficiency in process. Because tax treaties are Article II
treaties, the House is entirely cut out of the tax treaty process despite its long
constitutional pedigree as the initiator of tax policy on the domestic side.257
Somewhat puzzlingly, this stands in contrast to trade treaties, with which the House
has remained involved through congressional executive agreements. The House’s
participation in the trade treaty context has been justified, in part, because of its
traditional role over revenues, as set forth in the Origination Clause. 258
The treaty process often flies under the radar. Most of the treaty negotiating
process happens behind closed doors, with multinational corporations strategically
communicating their policy positions to negotiators. 259 It is not surprising that the
paucity in process benefits special interests like these corporations. Each step in
the legislative process can potentially derail any proposal. The more robust process
means the greater potential for policy failure. When the context is bestowing
256
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benefits to special interests (as opposed to the public), a less robust process will
accrue to their benefit. 260 Tax treaties reduce the tax bills of multinational
corporations and do not increase taxes. Therefore, their relatively easy path to
enactment favors such constituents at the expense of the public. Additionally, the
resultant lobbying power of the corporations helps to explain why tax treaties exist
in their current form—to benefit industry. The lack of process generally benefits
policy that would otherwise be controversial in the legislative process.
Thus, a nefarious explanation for why tax treaties look the way they do is
that they are simply a less visible way to funnel U.S. revenues to multinational
corporations. Seen as tax incentives that do not have the scrutiny of the legislative
or budget processes, they are invisible and against the public interest. 261 Perhaps
then it is not so puzzling that the United States would remain in treaties that are
antithetical to its interest—to be able to deliver benefits to powerful constituencies
without some kind of reckoning.
Groups that might normally be opposed to funneling benefits to
multinational corporations, such as labor unions, are absent from the tax treaty
process, in spite of their engagement over the reach of our international tax system
as implemented through domestic law. 262 Domestic policy disfavoring outbound
investment is in direct conflict with the lowering of withholding rates through the
treaty, yet public debate only focuses on the former. These advocacy groups may
overlook tax treaties because the process forecloses open and vigorous deliberation.
In fact, their significant participation in trade treaties suggest this might be the case
since such treaties, as congressional-executive agreements, are subject to greater
process than tax treaties. 263
The other major deficiency in process is the lack of revenue estimates of tax
treaties, or any studies undertaken by Treasury that might justify entrance into
particular tax treaties. 264 The lack of consensus on whether tax treaties increase
foreign direct investment and the reversal of trade flows that the United States has
experienced over the past few decades, which almost certainly impacts the revenue
picture of the treaties, makes the omission from the budget process especially
troubling. 265
Not only are there no revenue estimates when the United States enters into
treaties, the benefits they funnel to taxpayers also do not show up on the tax
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expenditure budget, 266 which the JCT publishes to account for revenue losses from
special tax benefits. Many decades ago, Stanley Surrey famously concluded that
such preferences should be highlighted as equivalent to government spending since
they constituted revenue losses. 267 Among such preferences Surrey highlighted
were certain tax benefits provided by tax treaties. 268 The absence of tax treaties
from the tax expenditure budget allows for an easier path to treaty conclusion. 269
One might try to justify omission of tax treaties from the tax expenditure
budget as reflecting difficulties in defining the appropriate baseline. Surrey and
McDaniel argued, for instance, that reduction in gross withholding taxes are not tax
expenditures because they reflect an approximation of the tax burden if it were
applied on a net basis.270 Of course, if the rate was very low or zero, as is the case
for certain types of income under the treaties, then such justification for omission
from the budget would not be applicable. Another justification for omission might
be that the exercise would prove too challenging for the estimators. 271 Presumably,
however, JCT could attempt to produce some average tax rates applicable to net
investment income on the domestic front and use this as an approximate baseline.
Moreover, this line of argument does not extend to the regular budget
process. In estimating revenues for purposes of the enactment process (if such
revenue estimates were produced), the proper baseline is not a normative one but
generally follows current law with some prescribed modifications. 272 In that
context, the proper revenue baseline should be the 30% withholding rate applicable
to net investment income earned by non-U.S. residents.
The paucity in process might also have several other ramifications. As
discussed above, treaties do not seem to fulfill their stated or unstated purposes.
Enhanced deliberation might help clarify the objectives of tax treaties, or expose
the lack thereof. 273 Additionally, the process problem might also help explain why
tax treaties are surprisingly uniform in nature, a suboptimal result given the
variances in relative trading positions of the U.S. and its tax treaty partners. 274 More
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robust process might help to create heterogeneity among the treaties, tailoring them
to various national interests.
Finally, although powerful constituencies shape U.S. treaty policy as a
matter of political economy, there is reason to be hopeful that there is some room
for reform of the process. Although tax treaties have historically been approved as
a matter of course, the politically charged environment has made this less likely. 275
Although opponents of tax treaties have blocked them for reasons unrelated to the
problems discussed here, perhaps this controversy will shift the burden to
proponents to analyze and justify their costs.
B. The Lock-In Effect
Another obstacle to treaty innovation is the fact that the international tax
system is comprised of thousands of bilateral treaties. Any changes must generally
be made treaty-by-treaty, and, as discussed above, the proliferation of the treaties
has created a “network effect” whereby deviation from the script is disapproved in
the global community. 276 Tax treaties are based on a common standard that
provides more and more benefits the greater the number of adopters. 277 The OECD
treaties have positive network externalities along the dimensions of predictability
of legal content, enforcement, and the signaling of a credible commitment to a
stable regime. 278 But as the network grows, so do its costs.
First, the initiators can exploit the network to extract “cartelistic gains from
potential competitors and monopolistic rents from its own users.” Second, there is
a strong lock-in effect; the treaty remains in force even when the standard becomes
undesirable because it becomes difficult for users to establish a new network. This
is because any purveyors of a new standard will have a difficult time recruiting
other states to join the new network without a critical mass that can reduce risk and
transition costs. 279 At one time, the United States, and other developed nations, may
have rationally preferred the treaties’ tilt towards the residence country when they
were capital-exporting, but they are now locked into that position long after it no
longer makes sense. As a result, the status quo reigns.
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C. Race to the Bottom
Nations may also enter into tax treaties with countries in which trade flows
are obviously and persistently asymmetrical in order to receive legitimacy on the
international level, although this is unlikely to be the case with established countries
like the United States. They may hope to increase foreign direct investment through
the reduction in tax burden, although, as discussed above, the evidence on this is
mixed. 280 A more nefarious explanation could simply be the exploitation of
politically “weak” countries by “strong” ones. Countries could be engaging in a
race to the bottom, whereby one country chooses the sub-optimal option of joining
the treaty network because it fears others will do so as well, thereby crowding it out
of the investment environment.
In particular, source countries may assent to the regime in spite of its
favoring residence countries because of a prisoner’s dilemma scenario. 281 If all
source countries are competing to attract foreign direct investment, they could be
in a better position to agree to not sign treaties and maintain their revenues.
Anticipating defection, however, a source country may choose to enter into a treaty
because they may be better off if the other source country does not sign the treaty,
although still worse off than in a world where the source countries all agreed not to
participate in the treaty regime. They also will be better off than if they are the fool
who did not sign the treaty when the other one did. We could model this dilemma
as follows, with the order of preferences per country noted numerically from 1 (the
most preferable) to 4 (the least):
A

COUNTRY A
No
treaty Treaty (Does
B
(Cooperates)
not cooperate)
COUNTRY No
treaty
2
1
B
2
4
(Cooperates)
Treaty
4
3
(Does
not 1
3
cooperate)
Under this scenario, the countries are worse off if all join since there is a
perhaps only a modest possibility of increasing investment but with fewer revenues.
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Yet, this is the likely outcome given that a worse outcome would be if one country
joins the treaty network and the other one is left out. Coordination problems, thus
may explain why countries with divergent interests enter into tax treaties. 282
Finally, the world is changing, and developing countries do not seem as
eager to sign double tax treaties as they once were. 283 As I mentioned above, even
developed countries have started to contemplate self-help regimes around the
treaties. 284 Thus, just because tax treaties have evolved as the building blocks of the
international tax regime does not mean they will continue to serve that function.
V.

UNRAVELING THE TAX TREATY

In light of the foregoing discussion, how might we reconceptualize the tax
treaty? The world seems to be moving away from the prioritization of residence
country taxation. The recent U.S. international reform and proposed and enacted
taxes in Europe can be seen as strengthening taxation by the “source” country. 285
Furthermore, the double tax treaties have recently been under attack by developing
countries, who now question whether it is in their interest to sign them. The pressure
that globalization, stateless income, and technology have placed on the antiquated
international tax system may cause other countries also to doubt the relevance of
tax treaties. As a result, the bargains long reached in the tax treaties may very well
be finally upended.
This is because the international tax system, based on antiquated and
artificial source rules, is fundamentally at odds with the nature of today’s world
economy. Geopolitical, technological, and economic forces, as well as the
phenomenon of stateless income, will require policy innovation that is likely to be
in tension with the bargains reached long ago in tax treaties. The allocation of taxing
rights no longer makes sense for many countries, both developed and developing,
but instead serves a small but powerful constituency—the multinational
corporation. The new international tax system will likely place more emphasis on
source-based taxation, as a response to the fact that residence country taxation has
diminished, and contain more destination-based rules, as a response to the ability
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of multinational corporations to more easily game origin-based rules. So far, tax
treaties have served to thwart such innovation, but the desperate need for revenues
may eventually require it.
Thus, it seems that the tax treaty provisions that allocate taxing jurisdiction
should be jettisoned. Yet some of the treaty provisions that do not relate to the
allocation of income should be retained, or at least could be kept with little cost.
For instance, any shift to destination-based taxation is likely to be incremental. As
a result, the rules regarding transfer price enforcement will likely be useful in the
interim. The information exchange provisions are less useful with the rise of other
international agreements in the area and should yield to those. Their retention does
little harm, however, unlike the allocation of income provisions. Nondiscrimination
may be more appropriately dealt with by trade treaties, as discussed above, but this
may be asking too much of a system that is currently also in a state of upheaval.
Moreover, given the flexible interpretation U.S. courts have given
nondiscrimination, it may not provide as many obstacles to fundamental reform as
the jurisdictional provisions do.
As discussed above, the OECD has completed a multinational instrument
that aims to create a streamlined mechanism by which countries can amend their
existing tax treaties to include BEPS measures, subject to domestic ratification
procedures. 286 The aim is to allow countries to update their treaties without the need
for treaty-by-treaty negotiating. This effort is, in some ways, not as ambitious as it
first appears. It primarily relates to proposals, like the limitation on benefits and
mandatory arbitration provisions, that can be found in existing treaties entered into
by the United States. In general, the BEPS process leaves in place treaty rules
dividing the tax base between the two countries and does little to update those
concepts. Treaties are also only amended if there is a two-sided “match” between
treaty partners in choosing which of the new provisions to adopt. Still, one could
imagine that the multilateral instrument may eventually extend beyond the BEPS
project, inducing the United States to sign on to it. 287
Somewhat paradoxically, the multilateral instrument, which was designed
to breathe new life into the double tax treaty regime, could be used to scale it down.
Additionally, although many nations and experts have opposed a multilateral
regime for encroaching upon national sovereignty, the new instrument could be
leveraged to restore sovereignty over tax policy.
Specifically, the multilateral instrument could be used to opt out of those
aspects of the tax treaties that reallocate taxing jurisdiction while maintaining the
still useful features such as dispute resolution mechanisms and nondiscrimination
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provisions. This would allow countries to examine where it is in their interest to
give up source-based taxation and where it is not. Essentially, rather than countries
signing on to a system of treaties that are identical to one another, the multilateral
instrument could be used to tailor treaties to the particular needs of a set of
countries, creating a heterogeneous international tax system. 288
This new heterogeneity of the tax treaties, although disruptive in many
respects, could more fairly reflect the incongruity of trade flows between countries,
differences in the elasticities of taxing foreign income between nations, variances
in revenue needs, and divergence in gains from comity and reputation. Although
this diversification could occur unilaterally, the multilateral instrument provides a
mechanism to do so without jettisoning the treaty framework altogether or taking
the controversial move of treaty termination. It would also obviate the need for
painstaking treaty-by-treaty negotiation. Moreover, it provides a mechanism to
automatically update treaties as the circumstances of a nation changes.
Leveraging the multilateral instrument would also allow for intermediate
options that a nation could opt into. Instead of abandoning the low treaty rates on
withholding, for instance, they could be raised somewhat in between the current
treaty rates and the statutory rates. Nations could even specify a range that they
would tolerate, and if the treaty partner’s range also matches, then the treaty rates
could be adjusted to the mid-point of overlap.
Another more moderate option would be to expand upon the permanent
establishment concept, allowing for taxation at source without necessarily a
physical presence. Although this proposal was rejected in the BEPS effort, it should
be revisited. Political interest in digital taxes has increased since then, and an
expanded notion of permanent establishment would accommodate these and more
destination-based approaches to taxation. Reforming the concept of permanent
establishment could also make source country jurisdiction contingent upon
administrative capacity of the source country. 289 Since a country without the ability
to collect source country taxes is arguably not losing anything from residence
country taxation, treaty partners may decide this is an efficient allocation of taxing
jurisdiction.
An important aspect of this approach is flexibility. Currently, the
multilateral instrument goes a long way in this regard by allowing countries to opt
in and out of proposals. Even the minimum standards, which signatories to the
instrument are required to meet, can be fulfilled in a variety of manners. Since the
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multilateral instrument allows nations to pick and choose which treaties are subject
to which new provisions, this would allow countries with asymmetric trade flows
or different tax systems to opt out of the tax allocation provisions when it is not in
their interest. Given the fact that, under asymmetric trade flows, one capitalexporting country will likely benefit from residence-based taxation and the other
capital-importing country will lose, it is likely that unilateral rejection of these
provisions will be controversial. Once the other country sees that withdrawal is
imminent, however, it is likely in their interests to acquiesce to the unilateral
withdrawal rather than risk the termination of the entire treaty. The countries may
also decide to come to an agreement to scale up source-based taxation. Moreover,
the multilateral instrument could provide a means to revisit the treaties if a
country’s economic circumstances changed.
Rather than the 3000 tax treaties that are nearly identical to one another, we
could have a system of bilateral tax treaties that better reflect national interests.
Moreover, by deemphasizing residence-based jurisdiction, this type of system may
assist in helping to solve the stateless income problem. Finally, because the pared
down treaty system would necessarily give way to more domestic solutions,
international tax could respond more readily to current economic conditions and
tax planning maneuvers. Although some might critique this solution as causing
chaos in the international tax sphere, I would argue that we are at least on the
precipice of that point already, and an ordered unwinding of the system is preferable
to unilateral moves by individual nations that we are beginning to see.
Another advantage of this proposal is that it would give nations the space
and flexibility to experiment with new ways to tax cross-border income. As
countries have struggled with various methods of taxing stateless income it has
become apparent that fitting such new taxes into the old tax treaty model is a fool’s
errand. Moreover, the time to explore novel approaches to cross-border taxation is
now, as the E.U. state aid controversy and other developments have suddenly cast
doubt upon the longstanding status quo of preventing double taxation as the sole
focus of the international tax system. 290
If tax treaties are at least partially unraveled, we might ask how and when
the new system should be rebuilt. It is my view that even if true multilateral
coordination of the tax base is not achieved, abandonment of or scaling down
aspects of the current bilateral system is still worthwhile given their harmful effects.
Ideally, however, a new system could be put into place as the older treaties are
being unraveled. The first best solution would be to for nations to come together to
decide on new principles that can accommodate destination-based taxation. Such
principles must extend beyond the EU’s current sectorial focus of digital taxation
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and the geographic focus on large U.S. corporations. Multilateral solutions should
also strengthen source-based taxation in instances where the residence country is
not taxing the income. To the extent an initial allocation of taxing jurisdiction is
retained, the multilateral instrument could, for instance, pursue provisions that
“throw-back” the tax to a state if the state of initial apportionment does not tax the
item. 291
More modestly, the multilateral instrument could be used to resolve
problems of inconsistent tax treatment. For instance, countries could agree to
harmonize their tax rules in certain areas or to make adjustments to their domestic
rules in order to achieve consistent tax treatment. 292 It could also be used to refine
source rules to incorporate more destination-based concepts such as customer
base. 293 Domestic double-tax relief systems could then function in a better manner.
Likewise, other problems of cross-border arbitrage could be addressed by the
multilateral instrument. 294
If multilateral solutions are not found, domestic law could step in to serve
as a coordination device. For instance, domestic law could impart some of the give
and take in foreign relations by premising code provisions on reciprocity. This
would allow nations to have more control over their revenue policy while also
partially tying tax systems together. This would also address one potential objection
to ceding more authority to individual nations—that control over international
relations would be lost because nations would no longer have the quid pro quo
negotiation that the treaty system imparts.
It would also remove some of the arbitrariness in applying different policies
to treaty and nontreaty countries, even if the economics or politics of the situation
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call for uniform treatment between the two. A reciprocal code provision would
instead tie foreign relations policy to the desired criteria. For instance, a code
provision could re-allocate profits from a foreign related party to a domestic related
party if the foreign profits were not subject to meaningful taxation abroad. This
would be similar to the new kill-switch provisions in the 2016 U.S. Model treaty
but would have the advantages that unilateral decision-making brings. 295 After all,
precisely those countries that are reluctant to tax such income may also be reluctant
to implement these new treaty provisions. Other destination-based statutory
solutions, like destination-based taxes or experimental source rules, could also be
utilized to preserve taxation of business income. 296 As these rules are enacted by a
powerful country like the United States, other nations may follow suit, creating
harmonization without multilateral action.
Another significant advantage domestic law has over treaties is, at least in
the United States, greater democratic process and transparency. With regard to
statutory changes, both houses of Congress are involved, there is greater
opportunity for deliberation, and any changes would be subject to the normal
budget process. 297 This has the advantage of bringing scrutiny over policies that
benefit multinational corporations at perhaps great cost to the fisc. Although one
can make the case that tax treaties allow countries to strategically enact different
tax systems for foreign and domestic investors, 298 such differentiation would still
be attainable in, and would benefit from, a robust legislative process. Such a
solution would also lend itself to greater policy innovation and fiscal flexibility.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, this Article finds fault with the traditional justifications
offered in favor of bilateral tax treaties. Most criticism towards these treaties has
been done on behalf of developing nations, but countries like the United States also
stands to lose from the status quo. Rather than accommodating tax reform or
reflecting differences in tax systems or trade flows, the treaties, by and large, are
entrenched and follow a single model. In these respects, the most damaging aspects
of the tax treaties are those provisions that allocate taxing jurisdiction. This Article
suggests that countries should abandon or scale back these provisions and offers
the new multilateral instrument as a possible means to do so. The hope is that this
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process paves the way toward a more dynamic and heterogenous tax treaty. Gone
are the days where nations are able to invoke some notion of worldwide efficiency
to justify a uniform international tax system. Instead, the system must do its best to
coordinate within a world of competing national interests.
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